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INTRODUCTION
Many laws address the ﬂow of information between private parties. Familiar
examples include the torts of deceit, negligent misrepresentation, nondisclosure,
and defamation; criminal fraud statutes; securities law, which includes both
disclosure duties and penalties for false statements; false advertising law;
labeling requirements for food, drugs, and other consumer goods; and, accord-
ing to recent scholarship, information-forcing penalty defaults in contract law
and elsewhere. Taken together, these and similar laws constitute what I will call
the “law of deception.” They regulate the ﬂow of information between private
* John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. © 2012, Gregory
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parties to prevent dishonesty, disinformation, artiﬁce, cover-up, and other forms
of trickery, or to avert mistake, misunderstanding, miscalculation, and other
types of false belief. This Article argues that the law of deception is a natural
legal kind: one encounters similar problems of design, function, and justiﬁca-
tion throughout the category. Yet, with the exception of several important
articles by Richard Craswell,1 legal scholars have considered only this or that
species, ignoring the genus as a whole. This Article makes a start on a general
theory.
My more speciﬁc claim is that one can distinguish three regulatory methods
within the law of deception. Interpretive laws prohibit the making of untrue
statements. These laws require fact-ﬁnders to interpret the meaning and then
test the veracity of what was said, an inquiry that employs everyday semantic
norms to achieve legal ends. Purpose-based laws target acts done with the
wrong intent, such as with the aim of concealing the truth. Rather than employ-
ing an objective standard of behavior, these laws deﬁne the object of regulation
by an actor’s wrongful state of mind. Causal-predictive laws employ everyday
folk psychology, empirical studies and cognitive theory to predict a behavior’s
deceptive or informative effects. The causal-predictive method can be indiffer-
ent to the meaning and truth of the acts it regulates, as well as to the purpose
with which they are done. Each method has its strengths and its weaknesses.
After describing them in general terms, the Article applies the analytic frame-
work to the Lanham Act’s false advertising provisions. Judicial interpretation of
the Lanham Act has arrived at a mix of these three approaches that, by and
large, recognizes the limits and exploits the strengths of each. The proposed
theory’s ability to explain this part of the law of deception demonstrates its
value for understanding the whole.
The distinction between the interpretive, purpose-based, and causal-predic-
tive approaches might appear to be of primarily theoretical interest. If all of
these laws aim to prevent deception, why should it matter how they do so?
Lawmakers should simply use the best tools at their disposal, mixing and
matching as they go along. But the theory has a practical upshot. It explains, for
example, why the law of fraud contains so few interpretive rules. It suggests
that there is a deep error in the common law tendency to conﬂate fraud by
misrepresentation, fraud by concealment, and fraud by nondisclosure, which in
fact involve different regulatory approaches and therefore require attention to
different aspects of a transaction. The theory suggests a new category of fraud
1. See generally Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efﬁcient Regulation of
Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491 (1981); Richard Craswell, “Compared to What?” The Use
of Control Ads in Deceptive Advertising Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 757 (1997) [hereinafter Craswell,
Control Ads]; Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657 (1985);
Richard Craswell, Regulating Deceptive Advertising: The Role of Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L.
REV. 549 (1991); Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclo-
sure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565 (2006) [hereinafter Craswell, Taking
Information Seriously].
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by misdirection, which belongs together with fraud by concealment in the
category of purpose-based regulation. It identiﬁes both the strengths and the
limitations of new techniques for using cognitive theory and empirical methods
to regulate deception. It maps out a general division of labor between courts and
regulatory agencies. And it recommends speciﬁc reforms to judicial interpreta-
tion of the false advertising provisions of the LanhamAct.
With all that, the proposed framework is only the ﬁrst step toward a complete
theory of the law of deception. This Article focuses on the regulation of
transaction between private parties, leaving to the side laws that govern the ﬂow
of information between private parties and the state, as well as laws that aim to
structure informational ecosystems, such as the Internet or the press, more
broadly. In addition, this Article focuses on one aspect of laws of deception:
techniques for determining the object of regulation, the behavior to be regu-
lated. It does not systematically examine the different legal responses to that
behavior—such as the choice between liability rules and property rules, or that
between traditional command-and-control regulation and the methods that go
under the heading of “new governance.”
The proposed tripartite division is also a theory of design. This Article pays
only limited attention to the function or justiﬁcation of laws of deception. The
law regulates information both for consequentialist and nonconsequentialist
reasons. Deceptive behavior is a costly activity that aims primarily at the
redistribution rather than the production of value and often causes poor decision
making. Deception is often also a wrong that warrants public condemnation,
punishment, and compensation. I discuss the differences between these reasons
for regulating deception only by noting that some regulatory methods are more
suited to some ends than to others.
Lastly, the proposed theory is constructive rather than critical. It considers the
law of deception from within, as an instrument with an internal logic oriented
by its functions and justiﬁcations. The question is how such laws are supposed
to work, in both senses of the word. There are other important questions about
the law of deception. One group concerns practical hurdles to effective regula-
tion. Richard Craswell, for example, has argued that much legal thinking in this
area employs an oversimpliﬁed picture of how information works, resulting in
wasted efforts, lost opportunities, and unintended consequences.2 One can also
ask about any area of law whether it doesn’t serve hidden ends. Laws purport-
ing to be about deception can be used for other, less attractive purposes. An
example here is Jennifer Roback’s description of how Southern lawmakers
employed the law of promissory fraud during reconstruction as part of a
systematic effort to bind African-American workers to their employers.3 That
2. See generally Craswell, Taking Information Seriously, supra note 1.
3. Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1166–68 (1984), reprinted in LABOR LAW AND THE EMPLOYMENT MARKET 217 (Richard
A. Epstein & Jeffrey Paul eds., 1985).
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this Article poses a somewhat different question does not reﬂect a judgment
about the importance of these other inquiries. The law of deception is a complex
object of study, and light dawns only gradually over the whole.
All that said, the proposed analytic framework describes a large swath of the
law of deception. That framework reveals a set of regulatory challenges and
solutions that reappear across areas of law we commonly treat as distinct. And it
puts us on the road to a more complete understanding of the law of deception as
a whole.
Part I of the Article identiﬁes three methods the law uses to regulate decep-
tion between private parties, which correspond to three types of laws of
deception: interpretive, purpose-based, and causal-predictive. Part II examines
the reach of each method, that is to say, the types of informationally signiﬁcant
behavior each can effectively regulate, and the institutional capacities necessary
for each. Finally, Part III applies that typology to describe and explain develop-
ments in judicial interpretation of the LanhamAct’s false advertising provisions.
I. THREE REGULATORYAPPROACHES
The design of a primary law must answer two questions:4 What acts should
the law target? And how should the law regulate those acts? The ﬁrst question is
about the direct object of regulation: what, for example, counts as a legal
wrong?5 The second is about regulatory technique: how should the law respond
to such wrongs? The law of theft, for example, has as its direct object inten-
tional nonconsensual takings of physical property and responds to them with
criminal penalties. Nonconsensual takings are also among the direct objects of
the tort of conversion, but the tort attaches different legal consequences. Same
direct object, different technique. The law of criminal conspiracy, on the
contrary, targets different behavior than does the law of theft—agreements to
steal, as distinguished from stealing—but attaches similar penalties to that
behavior. Different direct objects, similar technique.
A complete analysis of legal design should address both the object of
regulation and regulatory technique. The questions are not independent. The
choice of regulatory technique depends in part on what behavior the law targets.
Criminal punishment is an appropriate response to intentional nonconsensual
takings; it is not the right response to nuisance. At the same time, the choice of
regulatory object depends on the costs and beneﬁts, broadly conceived, of the
best available techniques of regulating different forms of behavior.
This Article focuses on ways that laws of deception determine their regula-
4. “[P]rimary rules,” according to H.L.A. Hart, are rules “concerned with the actions that individuals
must or must not do . . . [whereas] secondary rules are all concerned with the primary rules them-
selves.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94 (2d ed. 1994).
5. Only duty-imposing laws deﬁne legal wrongs as such, and not all primary laws impose duties.
The law of wills, for example, deﬁnes a legal power rather than imposing a legal duty. That power,
however, might be designed to take consideration of the law’s informational effects, and as such might
belong to the law of deception.
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tory objects. I describe three methods for identifying behavior informationally
signiﬁcant enough to merit legal attention. Interpretive laws identify the object
of regulation by piggybacking on everyday extralegal norms of interpretation
and truth-telling. A familiar example is the common law of deceit by misrepre-
sentation. Purpose-based laws target acts done for the wrong reasons, on the
premise that acts intended to deceive or otherwise wrong others are likely to do
so. The law of fraudulent concealment serves as an example of purpose-based
regulation. Yet other laws employ what we know about human psychology to
identify behavior that is likely to cause or prevent deception. Some such laws,
like the regulation of ﬁne print, employ our everyday knowledge of how
humans work. Others apply more sophisticated empirical methods or cognitive
theories to predict informational effects. These causal-predictive laws identify
acts to be regulated without regard to whether those acts involve false communi-
cations or the purposes with which they are done. Much of the Federal Trade
Commission’s information-based consumer protection regulation belongs to this
third type.
These three regulatory types do not identify the whole of the law of decep-
tion. The Second Restatement of Torts, for instance, recommends that disclosure
duties be based in part in “customs of the trade” and “modern business ethics.”6
Alternatively, some scholars have suggested that we should look to economic
reasoning to determine when there is a duty to disclose.7 That said, the three
regulatory approaches I describe below represent the most widespread and
successful techniques in the law of deception, and constitute something like its
contemporary core.
A. INTERPRETIVE LAWS: DECEIT
As Joseph Raz has emphasized, law is an open system: “[I]t contains norms
the purpose of which is to give binding force within the system to norms which
do not belong to it.”8 That is, such laws give legal force to nonlegal norms.
Examples are manifold. Matrimonial law has traditionally given legal effect to
religious norms governing marriage; corporate law recognizes private articles of
incorporation and bylaws; contract law incorporates norms that govern entering
into and keeping agreements. Interpretive laws are another example. Such laws
identify deceptive behavior by giving legal force to everyday norms of interpre-
tation and truth telling. They identify the legal wrong by way of an extralegal
one. This section describes how interpretive laws work, using as an example the
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) & cmt. l (1977).
7. See generally, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 273–74 (3d ed. 2000);
Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61
AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971); Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15–16 (1978); Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information
Prior to Sale, 25 RAND J. ECON. 20 (1994).
8. Joseph Raz, The Institutional Nature of Law, 38 MOD. L. REV. 489, 502 (1975), reprinted in
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 103, 119 (1979).
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common law of deceit, narrowly deﬁned to include only intentional and reckless
misrepresentation, or lying.9
The Second Restatement of Torts describes the elements of deceit as follows:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or
law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in
reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss
caused to him by his justiﬁable reliance upon the misrepresentation.10
The comments deﬁne “misrepresentation” as “not only words spoken or written
but also any other conduct that amounts to an assertion not in accordance with
the truth.”11 The requirement that there be an assertion and that it be false is the
hallmark of interpretive laws. The common law of deceit is perhaps the most
familiar example, but there are many others. They include the torts of negligent
misrepresentation, defamation, and slander; the misrepresentation defense in
contract; criminal fraud statutes; civil and criminal securities fraud laws; and
laws prohibiting false advertising. While these laws have different scienter,
causation, materiality, and other requirements, all deﬁne the direct object of
regulation in the same way: false representations.
Not all deceptive acts involve misrepresentations. One who engages in
fraudulent concealment, for example, need not tell a lie. In Schneider v. Heath,
a ship owner kept a boat aﬂoat to prevent the buyer from discovering its rotten
hull.12 In Salzman v. Maldaver, the defendant seller allegedly placed undam-
aged aluminum plates on the top of bundles to conceal corroded ones beneath.13
In neither case did the alleged wrongful acts include false assertions, though it
was argued that they were calculated to deceive.14 Misdirection can also
deceive without misrepresentation. In In re Wells Fargo Securities Litigation,
the Ninth Circuit held that Wells Fargo might have committed securities fraud
by, among other things, underfunding its loan loss reserves, on the basis of
which sophisticated investors would likely underestimate the risk of loss posed
by the bank’s outstanding loans.15 While the loan loss reserve amounts were not
assertions about the bank’s risk proﬁle, they could have been calculated to
deceive investors. Another example can be found in In re Lages, in which the
9. Legal sources often employ the terms “deceit” and “fraud” more broadly to cover not only lying,
but also concealment, the failure to disclose, and other informational wrongs. One of my claims in this
Part is that this way of speaking obscures important differences between how the law gets at these
wrongs.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
11. Id. at cmt. b.
12. (1813) 170 Eng. Rep. 1462 (Ct. Com. Pls.) 1462–63, 3 Camp. 506, 506–08.
13. 24 N.W.2d 161, 167 (Mich. 1946).
14. See id.; Schneider, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1462–63.
15. 12 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1993), superseded by statute, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), as
recognized in Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2000).
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bankruptcy court held that bringing a third party to discussions about a real
estate purchase was calculated to give a false impression that the buyer was
represented by an agent.16 Again, deception without misrepresentation.17
The difference between these cases and misrepresentation proper is what Paul
Grice calls the difference between “getting someone to think” and “telling.”18 It
is sometimes possible to induce a false belief in another by manipulating the
evidence in a way that plays on the inferences she is likely to draw. Buyers
assume that aluminum sheets in the middle of the bundle are similar to those on
the outside; sophisticated investors take a bank’s loan loss reserves as evidence
of its outstanding loan amount. As Grice points out, such acts differ from
inducing a belief by telling a person something.19 Only in the latter case is there
a misrepresentation.
I call laws that target misrepresentation, as distinguished from other forms of
deception, “interpretive” because they require decision makers charged with
applying the rule to interpret the meaning of what was said.20 In order to ﬁnd a
misrepresentation, one must ﬁrst determine that there was a representation, and
if so, what its content was.
Given that every deceit case begins with an act of interpretation, it is
remarkable how little courts and commentators have had to say on the subject.
The dearth of interpretive rules in the law of deceit is especially striking when
compared to the surplus of such rules in the law of contract.21 Tort jurispru-
dence contains no analogs to contract law’s hierarchies of interpretive evidence,
rules of construction, or mandatory and default terms. There is no parol
evidence rule, no plain meaning rule, no contra proferentem rule. There are no
16. 386 B.R. 590, 600 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008).
17. It has been suggested to me that concealment and misdirection belong with the law of deceit
because both rest on implicit misrepresentations: that one has not hidden any material facts, or that
things are as they appear. (One occasionally encounters a similar explanation of why warranties belong
to the law of contract: because there is an implicit promise that the representation is true or the sample
representative.) But these hypothesized implicit representations do no explanatory work. One can
certainly say that by classifying concealment and misdirection as forms of deceit, the law acts as though
there are such implicit representations. And to the extent that actors are aware of the law, the rule might
even enter into their everyday interpretive practices. Legal rules inﬂuence extralegal interpretive norms.
But the law here is not recognizing an independently existing representation. It is not piggybacking on
our everyday interpretive practices in the way that the law of misrepresentation does.
18. Paul Grice, Meaning, 66 PHIL. REV. 377, 382 (1957), reprinted in PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY
OF WORDS 213, 218 (1989). Richard Moran has recently rethought Grice’s distinction in a way that
brings out the normative aspect of telling. Richard Moran, Getting Told and Being Believed, 5
PHILOSOPHERS’ IMPRINT, Aug. 2005, at 1, 1. In Moran’s view, the crucial difference is that in telling
someone that P, the speaker assumes responsibility for the truth of P. See id. at 16–23. Moran’s theory
provides a starting point for thinking about the moral bases of the law of deceit, a topic beyond the
scope of this Article.
19. See Grice, supra note 18.
20. There is also a broader sense of “interpretation,” the sense in which we interpret other’s beliefs
and intentions based on their behavior. Other laws regulating information—most obviously purpose-
based laws—are interpretive in this broader sense.
21. For a critical overview of the contract law rules, see generally Eyal Zamir, The Inverted
Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (1997).
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rules favoring interpretations in the public interest, directing courts how to ﬁll
missing terms, or imposing mandatory interpretations in certain circumstances.
The Second Restatement of Torts provides absolutely no guidance as to how a
court should determine the meaning of a deceit defendant’s words or actions.
The Second Restatement of Contracts, when addressing the same issue, pro-
vides only that “[w]hether a statement is false depends on the meaning of the
words [or other conduct] in all the circumstances, including what may fairly be
inferred from them.”22 This is not so much a rule as an anti-rule: the
fact-ﬁnder should consider any relevant facts, giving each the weight it
deems appropriate.
This difference is explained by the almost exclusive reliance of the common
law of deceit, unlike the law of contract, on the everyday, extralegal practices
we use to interpret the meaning of what people say.23 Interpretation in these
cases is not rule-free. But the relevant rules are not legal ones. They are the
social norms that govern the meaning and veracity of speech acts. The common
law of deceit, like other interpretive laws, recognizes and incorporates extrale-
gal norms of interpretation and truth telling.24
One of the strengths of interpretive laws lies in the context sensitivity of these
everyday interpretive norms. We often use words to say things that are different
from, and even at odds with, those words’ literal meaning. The law of deceit and
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 cmt. a (1981). One occasionally ﬁnds the same
anti-rule rule expressed in the cases. Thus Missouri courts have stated that a deceit defendant’s
representations are to be interpreted “in the light of the meaning which the plaintiffs would reasonably
attach to them in existing circumstances and the words employed must be considered against the
background and in the context in which they were used.” Haberstick v. Gordon A. Gundaker Real
Estate Co., 921 S.W.2d 104, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Toenjes v. L.J. McNeary Constr. Co.,
406 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Interpretive laws sometimes also work to change those norms. Cases ﬁnding misrepresentation
on the basis of a home seller’s failure to disclose termite damage, for instance, have arguably changed
the way sellers and buyers interpret what gets said in those transactions. See generally E.T. Tsai,
Annotation, Duty of Vendor of Real Estate To Give Purchaser Information as to Termite Infestation, 22
A.L.R.3d 972 (2011). I discuss this phenomenon in Part II.
24. This suggests that courts should exercise special caution in crafting legal interpretive defaults for
deceit cases. It does not follow that such defaults are never appropriate. As Ian Ayres and I have
discussed in detail, there are good reasons to interpret contractual promises as implicitly representing an
intent to perform. IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT
19–45 (2005). We suggest, however, that contextual factors should sometimes sufﬁce to defeat that
default interpretation. Id. at 105–12. And there are reasons to think that the implicit representation of an
intent to perform is a conventional, rather than a context-speciﬁc, one. See JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH
ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 54–62 (1969). Another example is the judicially crafted
rules for implied certiﬁcation under the False Claims Act, which hold that a claim for payment under a
government contract implicitly represents compliance with material terms, statutes, and regulations. See
Michael Holt & Gregory Klass, Implied Certiﬁcation Under the False Claims Act, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1
(2011). Here there are good reasons to impose on government contractors’ representations that might be
contrary to the everyday meaning of their speech acts. Id. If this is right, the implied certiﬁcation
doctrine is not an interpretive rule as I am using the term. While there is a large literature on
interpretive defaults in the law of contract, we as yet have no general theory of the narrower class of
cases in which interpretive defaults are appropriate in the law of deceit.
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other interpretive laws address that fact by incorporating not only dictionary
meanings and the generic rules of syntax and semantics, but also the rules that
determine what a speaker means in context.
Paul Grice was the ﬁrst twentieth-century philosopher to describe those rules
in detail. We can deﬁne “speaker meaning” as the meaning a competent
language user would attach to a speech act in the context in which that speech
act is performed. Speaker meaning often includes a speech act’s literal meaning,
what the law calls its plain meaning. Literal meaning is largely context indepen-
dent, governed by dictionary meanings and the rules of formal semantics.25 In
many instances, however, speaker meaning also includes nonliteral meanings
and implications, sometimes at the expense of a literal interpretation of the
speaker’s words. Grice described rules of conversational implicature that gov-
ern how we decide which meanings attach to a given speech act, that is, how we
interpret speaker meaning.
As an example, consider the well-worn facts of Laidlaw v. Organ, in which
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a tobacco buyer did not have a duty to
disclose to the seller news of the end of the War of 1812, but that “at the same
time, each party must take care not to say or do any thing tending to impose
upon the other.”26 The latter holding addressed the seller’s allegation that,
before the sale, its agent had asked “if there was any news which was calculated
to enhance the price or value of the article about to be purchased,” in response
to which the buyer had remained silent.27 The seller’s attorneys argued that
“[t]his reserve, when such a question was asked, was equivalent to a false
answer, and as much calculated to deceive as the communication of the most
fabulous intelligence.”28 While Marshall’s opinion is not entirely clear on the
point, it appears that the Court remanded the case for additional ﬁndings on that
misrepresentation claim.
The theory of conversational implicature explains that holding. Grice ob-
serves that in our everyday talk, a speaker’s choice of what to say is governed
by commonly understood rules. At any given point in a conversation, a partici-
pant’s possible conversational “moves” are limited by what Grice calls the
“Cooperative Principle”: “Make your conversational contribution such as is
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of
the talk exchange in which you are engaged.”29 The Cooperative Principle
entails four categories of more speciﬁc conversational maxims, in a list that is
not meant to be exhaustive:
25. “Largely” because, among other things, of the use of indexical terms like “you,” “I,” and “this,”
whose meaning in a sentence is context dependent.
26. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195 (1817).
27. Id. at 183, 188–89.
28. Id. at 189–90.
29. H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in THE LOGIC OF GRAMMAR 64 (Donald Davidson & Gilbert
Harman eds., 1975), reprinted in PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 22, 26 (1989).
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Quantity . . .
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current
purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
Quality . . .
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Relation . . .
1. Be relevant.
Manner . . .
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.30
Assuming arguendo that the seller in Laidlaw asked whether there was any
news, it would have been inappropriate for the buyer to respond that it was a
beautiful day. That response would have violated the maxims of relation and
quantity, being neither relevant nor as informative as was required for the
purposes of the exchange.
But the Cooperative Principle is not only a rule of conversational etiquette. It
also describes how we go about determining a speech act’s meaning in the
context in which it is produced. The above rules enable one to identify nonlit-
eral and implicit meanings. When a speech act’s literal meaning appears to
violate one or more of the maxims, a general presumption of cooperation
requires that we look for an implied meaning to bring it into conformity with
the Cooperative Principle. The seller’s argument in Laidlaw was in effect that
the Cooperative Principle required that if there was any important news, the
buyer respond to his question. More precisely, if the buyer knew of any news,
the failure to respond violated the ﬁrst maxim of quantity: make your contribu-
tion as informative as required. In the context of the question, it was therefore
reasonable to interpret the buyer’s silence as indicating that he knew of no
news, bringing his behavior into apparent conformity with the conversational
maxims. (Whether the argument was a good one is not my concern. The point is
that it was plausible, which is why the Supreme Court remanded the case.) The
Gricean maxims are not simply guides for how to behave in conversation. They
determine what is said, the meaning of a speaker’s words or actions in context.
The reason for the above detour into linguistic theory is that interpretive laws
work by picking up and giving legal effect to the everyday semantic norms—
the rules of conversational implicature—together with the familiar moral prohi-
bition on lying. The common law of deceit is ﬁlled with applications of these
rules to determine speaker meaning. For example, V.S.H. Realty, Inc. v. Texaco,
30. Id. at 26–27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
458 [Vol. 100:449THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
Inc., a classic half-truth case, applies the maxim of quantity.31 V.S.H. purchased
an oil storage facility from Texaco. After the sale, V.S.H. discovered multiple
leaks in the facility and alleged misrepresentation, arguing among other things
that after its “repeated inquiries” about leaks in the facility, Texaco disclosed the
existence of one leak but not others.32 The First Circuit concluded that, in
context, the disclosure of one leak could carry with it “some implication of
exclusivity”—an implication that Texaco knew of no other leaks.33 Given
V.S.H.’s repeated inquiries and the obvious importance of leaks in an oil storage
facility, disclosing a single leak without disclosing other known leaks would not
be “as informative as is required” for the purposes of the exchange.34 The buyer
was warranted in interpreting the disclosure as implying that there were no
other leaks. The court in Field v. Mans applied the maxim of relation: Be
relevant.35 Here the defendant allegedly asked the plaintiffs for permission to
sell a property after the sale had already been made, thereby causing them to
forego their right to accelerate a note pursuant to a due-on-sale clause. The
bankruptcy court had concluded that the request for permission implied that the
property had not already been sold.36 The request was relevant only if the
defendant still owned the property. The First Circuit held that plaintiffs were
therefore warranted in understanding from the request that the defendant had
not sold it.37
Yet another example can be found in the generally applicable rules for
distinguishing actionable representations of fact from nonactionable sales talk
or puffery. In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Jefferson Associates, for
example, the Texas Supreme Court held that a building manager’s statements to
a prospective purchaser that the building was “‘superb,’ ‘super ﬁne,’ and ‘one of
the ﬁnest little properties in the City of Austin’” were not statements of fact, but
mere sales talk.38 Interpreted literally, the statements were so vague as to violate
the ﬁrst maxim of quantity, “make your contribution as informative as is
required,” and so hyperbolic as to violate the second maxim of quality, “do not
say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”39 In the context of the conversa-
tion, it was therefore more sensible to understand them as exhortations to
purchase rather than as statements of fact.
In these and other cases the law of deceit piggybacks on the everyday
conversational norms that govern the meaning of what a speaker says. Laws that
31. 757 F.2d 411, 414–15 (1st Cir. 1985). For a general account of half-truths, see Donald C.
Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87
(1999).
32. V.S.H. Realty, 757 F.2d at 413–14.
33. Id. at 415.
34. See Grice, supra note 29, at 26.
35. 157 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 1998).
36. Id. at 38.
37. Id. at 46.
38. 896 S.W.2d 156, 163 (Tex. 1995).
39. See Grice, supra note 29, at 26–27.
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enforce the simple rule “do not lie” pick up and deploy the very complex and
context-sensitive rules of conversational implicature. This explains why the tort
of deceit does not include an array of legal interpretive rules. It is designed
instead to incorporate the highly structured, if rarely explicitly formulated, rules
we use in everyday conversation. I argue in Part II that the recognition and
incorporation of these familiar extralegal norms has a distinct beneﬁt. It allows
interpretive laws to issue rules that cover a broad range of otherwise difﬁcult to
deﬁne behavior, while at the same time putting people familiar with those
norms on notice of what the law requires of them.
I have focused on a single element of a deceit plaintiff’s case: misrepresenta-
tion. My suggestion is that the misrepresentation requirement is central to the
design of the common law of deceit in a way that other elements—scienter,
materiality, reasonable reliance, and harm40—are not. This is not to say that
those other elements are not important. But they play a secondary role. Their
purpose is not to identify the legal wrongs, but to sort out the correct legal
response to them.41
B. PURPOSE-BASED LAWS: CONCEALMENT
Interpretive laws adopt an objective deﬁnition of the informationally signiﬁ-
cant behavior they target. Whether or not a defendant made a misrepresentation
is an objective fact.42 Thus proof of negligent misrepresentation does not
require that the defendant knew that she was misrepresenting the facts,43 a
material falsehood can render a contract voidable even if made nonfraudu-
lently,44 and the Lanham Act imposes strict liability for all literally false
advertisements, with limited attention to the advertiser’s state of mind.45
But not all deception involves misrepresentation. Courts have long observed
that “it is part of the equity doctrine of fraud not to deﬁne it, lest the craft of
men should ﬁnd ways of committing fraud which might evade such a deﬁni-
40. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed.
1984) (listing the elements of deceit).
41. Like many useful conceptual distinctions, if pushed too far the difference between deﬁning the
regulatory object and determining the right regulatory response breaks down. To deﬁne the regulatory
object is to decide between two regulatory responses: legal action and legal inaction. Alternatively, if
we take the lines between different regulatory responses as given, we might say that scienter,
materiality, and similar tests deﬁne different regulatory objects. But the distinction is useful in
understanding how different laws work.
42. It is true, as Grice also points out, that interpretation commonly requires the identiﬁcation of a
speaker’s communicative intention. “‘A meant[] something by x’ is (roughly) equivalent to ‘A intended
the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this
intention’ . . . .” GRICE, supra note 18, at 220. But a speech act’s meaning depends not on the speaker’s
subjective, possibly private, intent. It depends, rather, on her manifest intent. Meaning depends, to
revert to a legal formulation, on the communicative intent that a reasonable person would attribute in
light of all the circumstances known to her audience.
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 (1981).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006).
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tion.”46 No objective deﬁnition can capture in advance all possible deceptive
acts. The law has responded by looking not only to what people say, but also to
their intent. As distinguished from interpretive laws, purpose-based laws deﬁne
the regulatory object by the purpose with which persons act. I have already
mentioned two examples: concealment and misdirection. I will use concealment
to illustrate the category.47
The Second Restatement of Torts provides that a party commits fraudulent
concealment only if she “intentionally prevents the other from acquiring mate-
rial information.”48 Although the drafters do not emphasize it, the deﬁnition
suggests that there is no such thing as mistaken, negligent, or even reckless
concealment. Concealment requires acting with the purpose of hiding material
information.49 If the ship owner in Schneider had kept the boat in the water not
in order to cover its rotten hull but because the dry dock was full, he would not
be liable for concealment. The Schneider plaintiff might have still had a case if
he could show that the defendant had somehow misrepresented, implicitly or
explicitly, the hull’s condition. If he were to bring his case today, he might argue
that the ship owner had a duty to disclose the state of the hull. But neither of
those arguments would involve an alleged concealment in the sense that inter-
ests me. Concealment proper requires that the defendant acted with the purpose
to conceal.
My claim is that, whereas interpretive laws identify the object of regulation
by way of violations of extralegal norms of meaning and truth telling, the law of
fraudulent concealment identiﬁes the object of regulation by an actor’s wrong-
ful purpose.50 Acts done with the purpose of concealing material information
are likely to do just that. By targeting acts done with that bad purpose, the law
captures a range of harmful behavior that would otherwise be impossible to
deﬁne in advance.
Sam Buell has proposed a similar explanation of what he sees as a de facto
“consciousness of wrongdoing” requirement in the law of criminal fraud.51
46. Smith v. Harrison, 49 Tenn. (2 Heisk.) 230, 242–43 (1870).
47. Courts sometimes use “concealment” to include also “mere non-disclosure when a party has a
duty to disclose.” Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130, 131 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). These courts use “active
concealment” to distinguish the comissive wrong from mere failure to disclose. Id. at 131 n.2. The
discussion in this section concerns only active concealment. I discuss failure to disclose in the last
section of this Part. See infra section I.C.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550 (1977).
49. Prosser and Keeton do not deﬁne concealment in a way that requires intent, though they do
characterize it as “active concealment of the truth.” See KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, § 106, at 737
(emphasis added).
50. The two techniques are not mutually exclusive. Thus courts often say that a deceit plaintiff must
show, inter alia, that the defendant made a misrepresentation and that she intended to deceive the
plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). In practice, however, courts rarely insist on
separate proof of an intent to deceive. It is usually enough to show that the defendant knew that her
statement did not accord with the facts, or that she was recklessly indifferent to its truth.
51. Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1971 (2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Buell observes that detailed ex ante deﬁnitions of criminal fraud and theft—
rules, as distinguished from standards—leave loopholes that bad actors can
exploit. The criminal law of fraud “guard[s] against a class of persons who
harbor a quasi-professional aim of evading legal constraint to the injury of
others” by combining an open-ended deﬁnition of the wrong with a very
demanding scienter requirement.52 The federal mail and wire fraud statutes, for
example, criminalize “any scheme or artiﬁce to defraud,” including schemes to
deprive another of “the intangible right to honest services.”53 This broad
deﬁnition is meant to capture sophisticated bad actors who attempt to evade
more narrowly drawn criminal laws. Open-ended standards can fail to put
persons on notice of what the law, or the judge who happens to apply it, requires
of them. The solution, Buell argues, is to require proof of the defendant’s
consciousness of wrongdoing, or “badges of guilt.”54 Thus in applying the
criminal law of fraud, prosecutors and courts require “evidence that the actor
sought to conceal some aspect of the truth about her conduct in order to avoid
the adverse normative assessments of others.”55 This de facto consciousness-of-
wrongdoing requirement serves two purposes. It indicates that the defendant’s
behavior was particularly likely to be wrongful or harmful, as the defendant
herself assessed it as such. And consciousness of wrongdoing ensures that the
defendant was on notice of the wrongfulness of her behavior, allaying familiar
concerns about ex post facto criminal lawmaking.
Buell’s theory is not about the law of deception as I use the term, but about
the crimes of fraud and theft. As a result, his analysis is driven by concerns that
differ somewhat from mine. For one thing, Buell’s residual category of fraud is
meant also to address bad acts whose wrongfulness does not lie primarily in
their deceptive effect. An employee who accepts a bribe against the interests of
her employer might want to conceal that fact, but the underlying wrong is more
52. Id. at 1989; see also id. at 1991 (“Open-textured law that grows and innovates in competition
with those who seek to evade it appears to be characteristic of any legal order that seeks to control
harmful human behavior, at least in any society mature enough to have a large economy.”). Buell
suggests that this is the only function of the criminal law of fraud. “Novelty might even be constitutive
of the concept of fraud, if we understand the choice to treat fraud as a category of wrongdoing as a
choice to prohibit something residual like ‘other forms of indirect taking of property.’” Id. at 1996. I
believe this overstates things. Criminal fraud employs multiple devices to deﬁne the target of regula-
tion. One is consciousness of wrongdoing, or “badges of guilt,” as Buell suggests. Id. Another is
intentional misrepresentation, without regard to any badges of guilt. The criminal law of fraud employs
both interpretive and purpose-based methods.
53. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346 (2000 & Supp. III 2003), quoted in Buell, supra note 51, at 1979
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has recently adopted a narrowing deﬁnition of
“honest services” fraud. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010).
54. Buell, supra note 51, at 1996.
55. Id.; see also id. at 2001 (“[T]he search for badges of guilt continues to drive how many
decisionmakers select novel cases for criminal enforcement.”). While I like Buell’s analysis of how
consciousness of wrongdoing can function to deﬁne the wrong in criminal fraud, his theory places a
great deal of trust in prosecutors and judges applying these open-textured laws. It would be preferable if
criminal fraud statutes expressly included “badges of guilt” requirements, which would permit greater
judicial oversight of decisions to prosecute and greater appellate oversight of trial court decisions.
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akin to stealing than to lying. Furthermore, because Buell is examining the
criminal law, there is a special concern about notice and ex post facto lawmak-
ing. These two aspects of Buell’s analysis explain his focus on consciousness of
wrongdoing. That reﬂective attitude is general enough to capture non-
informational wrongs and at the same time is tailored to assure that the
defendant is on notice of the wrongfulness of her behavior.
My category of purpose-based laws of deception is both broader and nar-
rower than criminal fraud as Buell describes it. The category is broader because
it includes noncriminal laws, with respect to which the ex post facto concern is
not so pressing. The category is narrower because it includes only laws that
target deception. These differences explain why the law of fraudulent conceal-
ment should require evidence not of the defendant’s reﬂective consciousness of
wrongdoing, but only of her wrongful purpose—her intent to conceal material
facts. While a mere intent to conceal might not answer worries about notice
apposite to the criminal law, it speciﬁcally targets the informational wrongs that
are the focus of the tort. That said, this subjective inquiry serves functions that
are similar to those Buell assigns the subjective inquiry in criminal fraud. That
one party meant to conceal material facts from the other, and succeeded in
doing so, is sufﬁcient to identify her behavior as wrongful and likely to
harm—thus the behavior is the proper target for regulation. There is, therefore,
no need for a separate inquiry into the semantic content of her acts (interpretive
laws) or a general inquiry into their probable effects (causal-predictive laws).
Additionally, the intent of a defendant to conceal a material fact provides
sufﬁcient notice for the civil consequences that attach to her actions.
This analysis suggests that while scienter requirements can be found in both
interpretive and purpose-based laws (and in some of the causal-predictive laws
described below), they serve different functions in these different contexts.
Interpretive laws deﬁne the object of regulation without reference to the actor’s
state of mind. The category can therefore include a range of fault standards.
Between parties to a contract, for example, a purposive, knowing, or reckless
misrepresentation supports a claim for deceit, with the possibility of punitive
damages;56 a material falsehood made negligently permits only a suit for
negligent misrepresentation, with damages limited to compensatory measures;57
and an unintentional, nonnegligent material misrepresentation simply renders
the contract voidable by the injured party.58 Where there is separate and
56. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, §§ 105, 110.
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, § 107, at
745–48.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981). The same section also provides that a
fraudulent nonmaterial misrepresentation renders a resulting contract voidable. Farnsworth reports,
however, that “although there is no shortage of cases allowing avoidance where the misrepresentation
was both material and fraudulent, or material but not fraudulent, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd cases that have
done so where the misrepresentation was fraudulent but not material.” 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.12, at 481 (3d ed. 2004).
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sufﬁcient evidence that the defendant made a material representation on which
the plaintiff relied to her detriment, the scienter inquiry functions not to
determine whether the defendant committed a deceptive act, but the appropriate
legal consequences of that act. These laws assess culpability, and perhaps also
materiality and foreseeability, based on the defendant’s intention that her false-
hood deceive. Proof of scienter might well play these roles in purpose-based
laws as well. But it has another more important function: to determine whether
there has been a deceptive act in the ﬁrst place. Because purpose-based laws
require no evidence of misrepresentation, it is the scienter inquiry, together with
proof of reliance and harm, that determines whether the defendant’s act was a
deceptive one. Scienter deﬁnes the object of regulation.
Fraud by concealment is not the only member of the category of purpose-
based laws. Misdirection is another. As distinguished from concealment, which
involves the hiding of facts or information, misdirection plays on inferences
other persons are likely to draw from facts or information to which they have
access—underfunding loan loss reserves because of the inferences investors are
likely to draw, or bringing a third party, whom the seller is likely to assume is
the buyer’s agent, to negotiations. Again we have deception without misrepresen-
tation.
Unlike concealment, to date courts and commentators have not distinguished
misdirection as a separate species of legal wrong. This is unfortunate. Allega-
tions of misdirection are commonly brought under the rubric of fraud or deceit
without considering that the defendant has not made a false statement as such.
As a result, there is less doctrinal clarity about the elements of a misdirection
claim. In Wells Fargo, for example, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the
defendant’s reckless disregard of how the loan loss reserve would be interpreted
would be enough to support a holding of either securities fraud under § 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or deceit under California law.59 This
seems too broad a rule with respect to the state law tort claim.60 Although the
Wells Fargo court repeated the “reckless or intentional” standard, one wonders
whether it would have upheld a holding of tort liability based solely on the
defendant’s reckless disregard of investors’ likely inferences.61 More satisfying
in this regard is Lages, where the court found that bringing a third party to talks
with the sellers was part of a “scheme to cheat plaintiff out of her commission,”
suggesting that it was the defendant’s purpose to deceive.62 Like concealment,
59. See In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1993), superseded by statute, Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codiﬁed as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), as recognized in Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1063–64
(9th Cir. 2000).
60. Perhaps it is not too broad a rule under federal securities law, which imposes many afﬁrmative
duties to disclose and arguably a general duty of care to clarify potentially misleading facts.
61. The plaintiffs also alleged intentional misrepresentations. See Wells Fargo, 12 F.3d at 924.
62. See In re Lages, 386 B.R. 590, 600 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008) (concluding that the debt was
nonetheless dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code because the debtors did not
obtain services from the plaintiff by means of their fraud).
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the law of misdirection should require the plaintiff to show that the defendant
intended the deceptive effects of her action.
Other examples of purpose-based laws can be found in judicially created
rules that supplement objective deﬁnitions of informational wrongs.63 Although
the law of misrepresentation generally excludes sales talk or puffery from its
scope, a sales talk defense will not succeed if the plaintiff can show that the
defendant intended her words to deceive.64 Bait-and-switch advertising is an-
other example. Federal regulations deﬁne “bait advertising” as an “insincere
offer” to sell whose “purpose is to switch consumers from buying the advertised
merchandise, in order to sell something else.”65 The purpose-based inquiry
captures the advertiser who sells one or two of the advertised goods in order to
avoid a charge of misrepresentation, while protecting the relatively innocent
advertiser who simply runs out of an item.66 Yet another example can be found
in judicial interpretations of the Lanham Act’s prohibition on false advertising.
As Part III discusses, courts have held that a plaintiff bringing a section 43(a)
claim will be relieved of otherwise applicable evidentiary requirements, includ-
ing that the advertisement was literally false or had a deceptive effect, if she can
show that the defendant intended the advertisement to mislead the public.67 All
of these rules deﬁne the legal wrong by way of the purpose with which an act is
done.
63. In addition to the examples described above, one also ﬁnds a purpose-based gap ﬁller in the law
of perjury. In United States v. DeZarn, the Sixth Circuit held that a witness charged with perjury cannot
use the literal truth defense where there was evidence that his responsive answers were deliberately
misleading. See 157 F.3d 1042, 1049 (6th Cir. 1998).
[A] perjury inquiry which focuses only upon the precision of the question and ignores what
the Defendant knew about the subject matter of the question at the time it was asked, misses
the very point of perjury: that is, the Defendant’s intent to testify falsely and, thereby, mislead
his interrogators.
Id. The DeZarn court distinguished the case from Bronston v. United States, which held that an intent to
deceive by way of a nonresponsive answer could not support a perjury conviction. 409 U.S. 352, 359
(1973).
64. See Weitzel v. Jukich, 251 P.2d 542, 544 (Idaho 1952) (holding there is an exception to the law
that says seller’s talk does not amount to misrepresentation which occurs when the parties have unequal
ways of knowing the truth); see also Hogan v. McCombs Bros., 180 N.W. 770, 772–73 (Iowa 1921)
(holding the exception for sales talk in the law of false representations does not apply to material facts
which “are made with intent to deceive”); Landis v. Rodgers, 249 P. 398, 400 (Okla. 1926) (holding an
expression of opinion made as an inducement to an ignorant party may be the basis for a misrepresenta-
tion action).
65. 16 C.F.R. § 238.0 (2010); see also Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d 707, 709 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“‘Bait
and switch’ describes an offer which is made not in order to sell the advertised product at the advertised
price, but rather to draw a customer to the store to sell him another similar product which is more
proﬁtable to the advertiser.”).
66. This analysis suggests an amendment to Ian Ayres and my discussion of bait-and-switch
advertisement. See AYRES & KLASS, supra note 24, at 149–50. There we emphasized the positive
function that proof of insincerity might serve in bait-and-switch cases. The analysis above suggests that,
where proof of misrepresentation is lacking or the evidence is equivocal, proof of bad purpose should
be enough.
67. See cases cited infra notes 139–42.
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C. CAUSAL-PREDICTIVE LAWS: CONSUMER PROTECTION
Yet a third category within the law of deception is what I call “causal-
predictive laws.” I will use the term “transaction element” to refer to any aspect
of a transaction between two or more parties. A transaction element might be
the content of a communication, the method or format of communicating,
noncommunicative acts or omissions, one or more terms of a deal, the parties’
relative experience or sophistication, or any other feature of the transaction. My
functional deﬁnition of “the law of deception” stipulates that such laws regulate
transaction elements because those elements are likely to cause or correct false
beliefs. There is a sense, then, in which all of the law of deception is concerned
with causation. But some laws inquire more directly into deceptive effects than
do others. Interpretive and purpose-based laws identify a transaction element’s
informational effects by way of an inquiry into its semantic properties or
intended effects. The deﬁning feature of causal-predictive laws is that they
investigate a transaction element’s informational effects more directly. Rather
than asking about its meaning and veracity or a party’s purpose in introducing
it, a causal-predictive law simply asks about a transaction element’s likely
effects on persons’ beliefs or knowledge. Such inquiries employ three sorts of
techniques: the application of everyday folk psychology to predict informational
effects, the empirical scientiﬁc study of those effects, and the application of
more sophisticated theories of cognition and information processing.
An example of regulation that uses only the ﬁrst technique is New York’s law
that the drafter of a printed consumer contract or residential lease may put the
document into evidence only if the print is clear and legible and in 8-point type
or larger.68 The obvious reasoning behind the law is that consumers are less
likely to read and understand contracts that are written in small, unclear, or
illegible print. The law requires neither a ﬁnding that the document was false
nor that it was produced with intent to deceive. The only question is the size,
clarity, and legibility of the print, a transaction element that has a predictable
effect on consumer understanding. Or consider the federally mandated three-
day cooling-off period for door-to-door consumer sales. The Federal Trade
Commission’s announced reasons for the rule included anecdotal accounts of
deceptive and high-pressure sales tactics, evidence that similar laws reduced the
number of consumer complaints, and the observation that “[t]he 3-day cooling-
off period will provide the consumer with an opportunity to discuss his pur-
chase with others, to reﬂect upon the provisions of the contract, and perhaps to
do a little comparative shopping.”69 I will call laws that regulate transaction
elements on the basis of our everyday, non-semantic understanding of their
68. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4544 (MCKINNEY 2007).
69. Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rule and Statement of Its Basis and Purpose, 37 Fed. Reg.
22,934, 22,942 (Oct. 26, 1972).
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informational effects “common sense regulation.”70
Other causal-predictive laws employ more sophisticated methods to deter-
mine a transaction element’s informational effects. A recent study by the
Federal Trade Commission, for example, concluded that existing mortgage
disclosure forms failed to convey key information to consumers, and that a
different format would result in signiﬁcantly better consumer comprehension.71
The FTC reached that conclusion by giving approximately 800 recent mortgage
customers one of two mortgage disclosure forms, asking them a series of
questions to test their comprehension and retention, and then determining which
form resulted in more correct answers.72 The study did not inquire into the
meaning of the forms, and there was no ﬁnding that one or the other was false.
Nor did it look to the intent with which the forms were produced. The FTC
simply observed that providing the information in the new format resulted in
more informed consumers, from which it concluded that regulations requiring
lenders to use that format would likely have positive effects in reducing
consumer misapprehension or deception.
I use “empirical regulation” to denote causal-predictive laws that take this
second approach. Empirical regulation is a common technique in consumer
protection law. Researchers and regulators have studied, for example, the
effectiveness of nutrition labeling on food,73 health warnings on cigarettes,74
and warning labels on alcohol.75 As will be discussed in greater detail in Part
III, empirical regulation also ﬁgures prominently into judicial interpretations of
the Lanham Act’s false advertising provisions, where courts have required
consumer surveys, copy tests, and other forms of empirical evidence to support
claims of implicit misrepresentation.
Causal-predictive laws can also take into account sophisticated general theo-
ries of cognitive or behavioral biases that predict how a transaction element is
likely to affect parties’ beliefs. Sometimes those predictions merely conﬁrm
common sense. Results from behavioral economics, for example, can explain
why cooling-off periods lead to better consumer decisions.76 Other predictions
70. Thanks to Rebecca Tushnet for prompting me to recognize the separate category of common-
sense causal-predictive laws and for these examples.
71. See JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM’N, IMPROVING CONSUMER
MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE FORMS ES-5
(2007), http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt.shtm.
72. See id. at 41–54.
73. See generally Lisa A. Sutherland et al., Guiding Stars: The Effect of a Nutrition Navigation
Program on Consumer Purchases at the Supermarket, 91 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1090S (2010).
74. See generally David Hammond et al., Graphic Canadian Cigarette Warning Labels and Adverse
Outcomes: Evidence from Canadian Smokers, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1442 (2004); David Hammond et
al., Text and Graphic Warnings on Cigarette Packages: Findings from the International Tobacco
Control Four Country Study, 32 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 202 (2007).
75. See generally J. Craig Andrews, The Effectiveness of Alcohol Warning Labels: A Review and
Extension, 38 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 622 (1995).
76. See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
“Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1238–47 (2003).
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run contrary to our untutored judgments. For example, common cognitive
biases make warnings much less effective than we might otherwise think.77
Building on general theories of cognitive bias and heuristics, Christine Jolls and
Cass Sunstein suggest that regulators take advantage of cognitive shortcuts
when designing warnings. Because “people tend to respond to concrete, narra-
tive information even when they do not respond, or respond far less, to general
statistical information”78 (the availability heuristic), consumers should be given
stories about harmful uses of a product, rather than simple bold-face warn-
ings.79
Another application of cognitive theory to regulatory design can be found in
Oren Bar-Gill’s examination of the informational effects of bundling separate
products together, such as a free cell phone with a two-year contract, or a
low-cost printer with high-cost cartridges.80 Bar-Gill concludes that because
consumers often over- or underestimate their use of a product or the value they
will get from it, such transaction structures tend to cause consumer mispercep-
tion of both value and price, and that regulations discouraging such bundling
would likely improve consumer information. Like the FTC’s empirical study of
mortgage disclosures, these results have nothing to do with whether sellers are
telling lies. In fact, the transaction elements that concern Bar-Gill are not even
communications. They can be neither true nor false. Nor do Bar-Gill’s conclu-
sions rest on a ﬁnding that sellers use bundling with the purpose of deceiving
consumers. These elements are amenable to the tools of causal-predictive laws
not because of their meaning or purpose, but because established theories of
cognition and information processing predict that they will have a deceptive
effect. I refer to this third causal-predictive technique as “theory-based regula-
tion.”
Empirical and theory-based methods are often applied in tandem. Empirical
studies draw their hypotheses from the realm of theory. And the predictions of
cognitive theory demand not only empirical veriﬁcation, but often also empiri-
cal speciﬁcation. Theories by design oversimplify the world. Thus Jolls and
Sunstein note that “overshooting is always a possible danger,” and argue that
experimentation is needed to calibrate any efforts to take advantage of heuristics
and cognitive biases when designing regulations.81 An example of the interplay
can be found in Ian Ayres, Sophie Raseman, and Alice Shih’s recent study of the
effect of informing utility consumers about how their energy usage compares to
77. See Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1193, 1229–41 (1994).
78. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 210 (2006).
79. See id. at 212–13.
80. See generally Oren Bar-Gill, Essay, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
33 (2006) [hereinafter Bar-Gill, Bundling]; see also Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L.
REV. 1373, 1402–04 (2004) (examining credit card issuers’ exploitation of common consumer cognitive
and behavioral biases by offering low annual fees while imposing high interest rates).
81. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 78, at 230.
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that of their neighbors.82 The study draws on Robert Cialdini’s theory that
normative messages are more effective in changing behavior when they convey
widespread adherence to the norm, as people tend to conform their behavior to
the perceived behavior of others.83 In 2008, the Sacramento Municipal Utility
District and Puget Sound Energy began providing comparative energy usage
information to thousands of customers and measuring their subsequent usage.
Ayres, Raseman, and Shih have used that data as empirical evidence of the
likely effect of requiring such information on energy bills and of how such
information should be presented. These causal-predictive results draw both on
Cialdini’s broader theory of how certain types of information are likely to affect
consumer behavior and on the empirical study of those effects.84
As I have said, there is a sense in which interpretive and purpose-based laws
are also about a transaction element’s likely deceptive effects. But those laws do
not deﬁne their direct object in terms of those effects. Interpretive laws require
an inquiry into meaning and truth; purpose-based laws an inquiry into mental
states. Causal-predictive laws investigate a transaction element’s informational
effects more directly, through the application of folk psychology, scientiﬁc
induction, cognitive theory, or some combination of the three. An important
consequence of this difference, which I discuss in the next Part, is that causal-
predictive laws need not limit themselves to communications or acts done with
a veriﬁable purpose. The methods can be applied to any transaction element that
has a predictable informational effect. But, I will argue, causal-predictive
methods also come with an important limitation: they can be effectively de-
ployed only when the behavior they target is repeated in substantially the same
form across multiple transactions.
II. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
I have identiﬁed three types of laws of deception, each deﬁned by how it
picks out the object of regulation. Interpretive laws recognize and incorporate
everyday norms of meaning and truth telling. Purpose-based laws look to the
82. Ian Ayres, Sophie Raseman &Alice Shih, Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer
Comparison Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage (July 16, 2009) (unpublished manu-
script), http://ssrn.com/abstract1434950.
83. See, e.g., Robert B. Cialdini, Crafting Normative Messages To Protect the Environment, 12
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 105 (2003); Robert B. Cialdini, Raymond R. Reno & Carl A.
Kallgren, A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms To Reduce Littering
in Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015 (1990).
84. Another example of the mixed use of empirical and theory-based methods can be found in
Maureen Morrin and Jacob Jacoby’s Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for an Elusive Concept,
19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 265, 266 (2000). Morrin and Jacoby showed subjects sample potentially
infringing trademarks, such as “Dogiva dog biscuits,” and then measured subjects’ response times and
accuracy when shown the original marks. The goal was to elicit empirical evidence for the theory that
trademark dilution causes confusion by increasing so-called internal search costs. For a trenchant
criticism, see Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86
TEX. L. REV. 507, 527–46 (2008).
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purpose with which an act was done. Causal-predictive laws use folk psychol-
ogy, the methods of the natural sciences, and cognitive theory to predict a
transaction element’s informational effects. Each picks out a different set of
transaction elements for legal regulation. That is, each describes a different
regulatory domain. Those domains overlap. An advertisement that includes a
false statement, is intended to deceive the public, and has a measurable decep-
tive effect might be reached by any or all of the methods. But the domains are
not coextensive. I have already mentioned several examples. Purpose-based
laws do not reach unintentional misrepresentations. Interpretive laws cannot
capture purposive concealment that involves no false statements as such or
noncommunicative transaction elements that have predictable informational
effects. The domain, or regulatory reach, of each method can therefore be
represented in a Venn diagram.
Figure 1
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The strength of each regulatory approach depends in part on the extent of its
domain—on the relative diameter of its circle.
The ﬁrst section of this Part describes the regulatory domains of each method.
The limits of purpose-based and interpretive laws are perhaps the most obvious.
Purpose-based laws work only when an actor’s purpose can be proven in court,
interpretive laws only when a transaction element is a communication that can
be shown to be false. Causal-predictive laws are subject to neither restriction,
and can address factors such as relative effectiveness and alternative acts that
the binary structures of the ﬁrst two approaches do not capture. But causal-
predictive laws have a limitation of their own: they can be effectively applied
only to elements that are repeated in the same form across many transactions.
While these conclusions are relatively simple to state, getting the nuances will
take some work. The second section deploys those conclusions to draw a few
lessons about the proper design and deployment of these different regulatory
methods.
A. THE DOMAIN OF REGULATION
The limits of purpose-based laws are most obvious. Many informationally
signiﬁcant transaction elements merit legal attention without regard to the
purpose with which they are included in a transaction. Examples include
unintentional misrepresentations, innocent failures to disclose, and opaque modes
of communicating, such as small print or overly technical language. Even when
informationally signiﬁcant acts are done with bad intent, purpose-based laws
can reach them only if those who apply the law—courts, juries, or regulatory
agencies—can see that intent. A bad actor’s purpose must be veriﬁable. Rules of
evidence, burdens of proof, and the inherent difﬁculty of proving state of mind
all create hurdles here. The domain of purpose-based laws includes only
transaction elements done with a veriﬁable wrongful purpose—a relatively
small set.
The domain of interpretive laws also has its limits, though they are both more
capacious and more plastic than those of purpose-based laws. Interpretive laws
apply by deﬁnition only to misrepresentations and so reach only false communi-
cations. More speciﬁcally, interpretive laws reach only transaction elements that
include assertions, express or implied, that are demonstrably false. They do not
capture deceptive acts that do not involve falsehoods, such as noncommunica-
tive behavior that has predictable informational effects or true statements that
nonetheless deceive.
One advantage of interpretive laws over purpose-based laws is that they can
be applied without an inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind. To ascertain
whether there is a misrepresentation, a legal decision maker must determine a
speech act’s meaning and its veracity. Both are objective facts. The question is
not the subjective, perhaps hidden, intent of the speaker, but the reasonable
interpretation of her words and actions and whether that meaning corresponds to
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the world. This difference marks a strength of interpretive as compared to
purpose-based laws: meaning and truth are easier to verify than purpose.
Interpretive laws are also more plastic than purpose-based ones. Interpretive
laws give legal force to extralegal norms. All social-norm-based laws are to
some degree constrained by the extralegal norms they incorporate. If, as the
Restatement recommends, the law of nondisclosure were to piggyback on the
ethics and expectations of businesspeople, it would reach only transaction
elements that businesspeople consider normatively signiﬁcant. By the same
token, interpretive laws can reach only transaction elements that our everyday
interpretive practices allow us to identify as false. But these extralegal norms
are not ﬁxed in stone, and laws can be structured in ways that extend them to
new cases, which can in turn change or give new content to them. Fifty years
ago, it was perhaps unclear whether in an arms-length sale of residential
property the seller had an ethical duty to disclose termite damage. Today, the
legal rule in many states is clear: the seller has a duty to disclose such
information.85 That legal change has affected the expectations of sophisticated
market participants, perhaps also changing the extralegal norms used to judge
fair practices. Similarly, by merely mentioning the terms “as is” and “with all
faults,” the safe-harbor rules for warranties in the Uniform Commercial Code
have affected the everyday meaning of those phrases.86 Or consider the implied
certiﬁcation doctrine, which courts have developed in applying the False Claims
Act. According to this rule, a claim for payment against the federal government
implicitly represents compliance with material contract terms, statutes, and
regulations.87 While that rule probably departs from everyday understandings of
what a request for payment means, it is perhaps also working a change in the
interpretive practices of government contractors. By adopting interpretations
that depart from, clarify, or restrict the meaning words otherwise have, the law
can change the nonlegal understanding of them.
The decision to depart in the law from everyday rules of interpretation
cannot, of course, be based on those rules. Reasons to change some norms must
come from the outside, as it were.88 Legal attempts to depart from or change
85. See, e.g., Pywell v. Haldane, 186 A.2d 623 (D.C. 1962); Piazzini v. Jessup, 314 P.2d 196 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1957); Smith v. Renaut, 564 A.2d 188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
86. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). The irony is that the provision
purports to use the two phases merely as examples of when “language that in common understanding
calls the buyer’s attention to the exclusion of warranties [and] makes plain that there is no implied
warranty.” Id. (emphasis added). By mentioning the two examples, the U.C.C. almost certainly
changed, or at least clariﬁed, the common understanding of those terms.
87. See, e.g., Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001); Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United
States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 433 (Fed. Cl. 1994), aff’d, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
88. Raz observes that whether lawmakers will want to extend a social norm to new instances
depends on the reasons why the law recognizes that norm. If it does so because lawmakers attach
importance to the social norm as such—what Raz calls “derivative” recognition—lawmakers are
unlikely to engage in normative innovation. If it is in order to advance other social interests not directly
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everyday interpretations of what people say cannot be based on those interpreta-
tions. Instead they will be supported by considerations like common sense
judgments of morality, fairness, or efﬁciency.89 Or they might be based on more
sophisticated arguments from economics, cognitive science, or empirical stud-
ies. The plasticity of interpretive regulation lies in the ability to combine it with
these other methods of determining the regulatory object.
There is, however, a limit to such normative innovation. An important
advantage of social-norm-based laws in general, and of interpretive laws in
particular, is they provide a low-cost way to ensure notice of what the law
demands. If most people are already adept at applying and complying with the
relevant social norms, they already know the scope of the related legal obliga-
tions. Because the law of deceit recognizes and incorporates everyday norms of
interpretation and truth telling, competent language users generally know what
it requires of them. It is enough that they understand the simple maxim: do not
tell a lie. This advantage is lost when the law departs too far from a person’s
everyday understanding of extralegal norms that govern their interactions. This
is not much of a worry where the legal innovation involves a clear rule applied
in limited situations to parties who are on notice that they are subject to it. This
is why we do not worry much about legal rules that clarify or extend the
disclosure duties of those who issue securities, of credit-card companies and
banks, or even of home sellers, or about ﬁxed legal interpretations of claims for
payment on a government contract. But as interpretive and other social-norm-
based regulation departs further from the extralegal norms it incorporates, it
calls for other means of ensuring that people know what the law requires of
them.
Both interpretive and purpose-based laws are subject to yet another limita-
tion, which corresponds to a strength of the causal-predictive approach. Richard
Craswell has argued that contract scholars too often think of disclosure as “a
binary or an all-or-nothing trait,” assuming that “there can be no such thing as
greater or lesser degrees of disclosure.”90 In fact, Craswell observes, informa-
tion can be presented more or less effectively, and the design of laws regulating
information ﬂow should take account of the effectiveness of the mode of
presentation.91 Craswell takes as his model consumer protection law, where
regulators and scholars have studied, for example, whether information should
related to the value of the recognized social norm—“original” recognition—lawmakers are more likely
to extend the norm to new cases and less likely to worry about the feedback effects discussed above.
JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 153–54 (1975); Joseph Raz, The Institutional Nature of Law,
38 MOD. L. REV. 489, 502 (1975); Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers II, 46
PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 79, 86–87 (1972).
89. Michael Holt and I have argued, for example, that the implied certiﬁcation rule is supported by
considerations of both morality and efﬁciency. Holt & Klass, supra note 24, at 38–47.
90. Craswell, Taking Information Seriously, supra note 1, at 569.
91. Id. at 585 (discussing inter alia Ian Ayres and my work on promissory fraud).
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be presented in absolute or relative terms, the effects of formatting and promi-
nence of disclosures, the effects of imagery, and the difference between framing
information in terms of beneﬁts and in terms of losses.92
Craswell identiﬁes the problem as limited vision of contract scholars. But
those limits reﬂect the common law methods they study. Interpretive and
purpose-based laws each pose to adjudicators a binary question: Was there a
misrepresentation? Did a person act with a wrongful purpose? Neither approach
is suited to evaluate the effectiveness of hypothetical alternative communica-
tions. Inquiries into purpose are about a defendant’s subjective state, not the
effectiveness of her acts. And while the rules of conversational implicature take
account of effectiveness (“Avoid obscurity of expression.” “Avoid ambiguity.”),
they provide no tools for measuring the relative effectiveness of different modes
of communication. The extralegal norms governing the effectiveness of commu-
nications are too uncertain and indeﬁnite to serve as a test for legal liability.
Interpretive laws therefore incorporate the simpler, binary norm: do not tell a
lie.
All of this, though stated in somewhat different terms, is of a piece with
Craswell’s analysis. To reach questions of effectiveness, the law must use folk
psychology, empirical studies, or cognitive theories that predict or test the
effects of different modes of presentation. Craswell therefore proposes that to
capture questions of effectiveness, the common law incorporate some of the
causal-predictive methods found in consumer protection law.93 I consider that
proposal below. For the moment, I simply observe that neither purpose-based
nor interpretive laws are, in themselves, suited to the regulation of effective-
ness. Those informational aspects of transactions lie in the domain of causal-
predictive regulation.
Another relative strength of causal-predictive laws is that they are limited
neither by legal actors’ purposes nor by transaction elements’ meaning and
veracity. Folk psychology, cognitive psychology, and the methods of empirical
sciences can be used to investigate acts without inquiry into actors’ purposes,
and they can be applied to both communicative and noncommunicative transac-
tion elements. I have already mentioned an example: Bar-Gill’s theoretical work
on the informational effects of bundling products together. While Bar-Gill
ventures some hypotheses about why businesses engage in bundling,94 his
analysis of the practice’s informational effects does not turn on those supposi-
tions. Nor is bundling a speech act with communicative content, or the object of
other extralegal norms. Rather, bundling is amenable to the causal-predictive
approach because cognitive theories of information processing predict that the
practice is likely to cause speciﬁc forms of consumer deception, and because we
92. Id. at 581–93.
93. Id. at 623–31.
94. E.g., Bar-Gill, Bundling, supra note 80.
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can imagine empirical studies that might conﬁrm or disprove those effects.
Causal-predictive regulation can also identify instances where truthful communi-
cations are ineffective or even deceptive. Though our everyday interpretive
practices suggest that clear warnings on consumer products should be enough to
inform users of their dangers,95 empirical studies and cognitive theory suggest
that such warnings in fact often fail to correct consumer misperception.96 And
while disclaimers can prevent misrepresentation proper, they will not prevent
deception if they go unnoticed or are not attended to.97 Causal-predictive
regulation can expand the law’s scope beyond falsehoods to address the informa-
tive and deceptive effects of communications more generally.
This suggests that the domain of causal-predictive laws is much broader than
the domains of purpose-based and interpretive laws. But causal-predictive
regulation too has its limits. I will use the term “repeat elements” to denote
transaction elements that are replicated in substantially the same form across
many transactions. Most mass-consumer contracts, for example, contain many
repeat elements: a single seller offers the same product in a similar format and
on similar terms to many different buyers.98 I will use “discrete elements” to
refer to transaction elements that appear in relatively few transactions. Highly
negotiated transactions are likely to include many discrete elements. “Repeat”
and “discrete” are relative terms: a given transaction element can be more or
less repeat or discrete. For one thing, a transaction element might be replicated
more or less widely. Boilerplate can be common to several contracts between
two players, to all contracts written by a single law ﬁrm, to many contracts in a
segment of a market, or to most contracts in the market as a whole. For another,
there are degrees of similarity. Elements of many mass-consumer transactions—
such as the words used in an advertisement—are identical across all transac-
tions. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the act of agreeing or promising, a
transaction element that is repeat insofar as it appears in every contract, but
takes many different forms. Finally, transactions as a whole can be described as
more or less repeat, depending on how many elements they share with other
transactions.
The distinction between repeat and discrete terms is important because
causal-predictive laws are effective only when applied to repeat transaction
elements. There are at least three reasons why this is so.
95. The everyday interpretive judgment is embodied in the so-called heeding presumption in
products liability law, which presupposes for purposes of judging causation that a consumer would have
attended to a warning had it been given. See Richard C. Henke, The Heeding Presumption in Failure To
Warn Cases: Opening a Pandora’s Box?, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 174, 185–89 (1999).
96. See Latin, supra note 77; Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 665–79 (2011).
97. See Craswell, Taking Information Seriously, supra note 1, at 583–84.
98. Repeat elements can also appear in transactions where neither party is a repeat player. The seller
and purchaser of an existing home typically do not engage in transactions of that sort, though their sales
contract probably includes elements identical to those in most other sales contracts.
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First, the scientiﬁc-inductive methods of empirical regulation require repeat-
ability. Field studies can be performed only on transaction elements that can be
standardized and replicated across multiple sample transactions. But many
informationally signiﬁcant transaction elements are highly discrete. The parties’
relative intelligence, their biases and backgrounds, and the unique history of
their relationship might all ﬁgure into deception. Such discrete transaction
elements are often difﬁcult or impossible to replicate, and therefore escape the
methods of empirical regulation.
Consider the familiar facts of Vokes v. Arthur Murray.99 Representatives of
the Arthur Murray School of Dancing allegedly used “a constant and continuous
barrage of ﬂattery, false praise, excessive compliments, and panegyric encomi-
ums” over the course of sixteen months to dupe Audrey Vokes, “a widow of 51
years and without family,” into purchasing fourteen dance courses, adding up to
2,302 hours of lessons for a total cash outlay of just over thirty-one thousand
dollars.100 The court concluded that Vokes had adequately pled fraud based on a
number of factors, including the school’s superior knowledge of her dancing
abilities, the relationship of trust that the instructor fostered with Vokes, and,
implicitly, Vokes’s vulnerability.101 In reaching its decision, the court appealed
to social norms of truth telling and disclosure, as well as evidence of the dance
company’s wrongful purpose.102 These considerations identify Arthur Murray’s
alleged behavior, taken as a whole, as a good target for regulation.
The Vokes complaint averred many separate acts and practices, some of
which might be amenable to empirical study. For example, the school allegedly
induced Vokes to purchase more dance lessons by awarding her “Bronze,”
“Silver,” and “Gold” medals.103 One might test how such prizes are commonly
understood and their effects on purchasing decisions. But it is hard to imagine a
ﬁeld study that would replicate and test the constellation of acts and circum-
stances that allegedly worked together to mislead Audrey Vokes. Not only
99. 212 So. 2d 906, 907–08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
100. Id. at 907.
101. See id. at 908–09.
102. See id. Much of the court’s analysis is taken up with the common law rules of misrepresenta-
tion and fraud. For example: “Even in contractual situations where a party to a transaction owes no duty
to disclose facts within his knowledge or to answer inquiries respecting such facts, the law is if he
undertakes to do so he must disclose the Whole truth.” Id. at 909. But the court also discussed Arthur
Murray’s likely purpose:
[I]t would be a reasonable inference from the undenied averments of the complaint that the
ﬂowery eulogiums heaped upon her by defendants as a prelude to her contracting for 1944
additional hours of instruction in order to attain the rank of the Bronze Standard, thence to the
bracket of the Silver Standard, thence to the class of the Gold Bar Standard, and ﬁnally to the
crowning plateau of a Life Member of the Studio, proceeded as much or more from the urge
to “ring the cash register” as from any honest or realistic appraisal of her dancing prowess or a
factual representation of her progress.
Id.
103. See id. at 909.
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would it be difﬁcult to capture all of those elements in a single experiment, but
they included facts, such as the dance instructors’ superior knowledge and,
according to the court’s description, Vokes’s emotional state, that would be
nearly impossible to replicate.
This ﬁrst limitation of the causal-predictive method applies only to the
empirical type. A second limiting factor applies both to empirical and to
theory-based regulation. This is cost. Reliable empirical studies are expensive,
worth the price only when they can be productively applied to regulate a large
number of transactions. And while theory-based lawmaking can be done from
an armchair, the proper application of cognitive theories requires expertise,
collaboration, and reﬂection. The work of applying purpose-based or interpre-
tive laws to a given set of facts, in contrast, can be done by a lay jury or
common law judge in the course of a single lawsuit, often without even a trial.
Unlike purpose-based and interpretive regulation, empirical and theory-based
lawmaking make sense only if their costs can be amortized over a large number
of transactions.
Lastly, there is the general requirement that subjects of a law be on notice of
what it demands of them. I argued above that interpretive laws can work to
change everyday interpretive norms, but that too much innovation of this sort
undermines one of their important advantages: nonsophisticates’ ability to
anticipate the law. That concern is all the more salient in the design of
causal-predictive laws. Whether a law is meant to guide behavior ex ante or to
remedy wrongs ex post, we want people to be able to predict what it expects of
them. Those subject to interpretive laws can rely on their familiarity with the
norms that govern meaning and veracity. Those subject to purpose-based laws
can rely on their everyday understanding of what counts as a wrongful or
deceptive purpose. Neither is available to the subjects of causal-predictive laws,
as these laws often depart from our pre-theoretical assessment of permissible
behavior.
The problem here is that the law ﬁrst sees a discrete transaction element only
at the end of its natural life, after the transaction has broken down. The results
of any empirical testing arrive too late to guide the parties, whose exchange is
water under the bridge. And cognitive theories of information processing are
new and developing, their applications dependent on expert knowledge and
judgment. Bar-Gill’s analysis of bundling104 is interesting because it is surpris-
ing, at least to those unfamiliar with the theories on which it is based. Although
sophisticated commercial parties no doubt use these theories in advertising and
elsewhere, one cannot presuppose general familiarity with them or their implica-
tions, which are often subtle, nonobvious, or contestable. Even the causal-
predictive rules generated by common sense or folk psychology, such as
104. See Bar-Gill, Bundling, supra note 80.
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type–size requirements or cooling-off periods, must be announced in advance if
they are to be effective going forward. While the reasons for those rules are
widely understood, the rules themselves do not correspond to familiar extralegal
norms or widely agreed-upon judgments.
Causal-predictive regulation’s restriction to repeat transaction elements marks
a comparative strength of both interpretive and purpose-based laws. To effec-
tively regulate discrete, informationally signiﬁcant transaction elements, a rule
must be stated at a high level of abstraction, so as to capture a broad range of
behavior in a way that is nonetheless sensitive to informationally relevant facts
and circumstances. Both interpretive and purpose-based laws ﬁt that descrip-
tion. Interpretive laws achieve generality by targeting only transaction elements
that are objectively meant to share information—communications—and by
ignoring all but the most obviously deceptive behavior—falsehoods. They
achieve context-sensitivity by recognizing and incorporating everyday rules
of interpretation that are highly attuned to the facts of a conversational
situation. The familiarity of those rules also serves to put people on notice
of what the law expects of them. Purpose-based laws, by picking out a
single informationally relevant fact—wrongful intent—capture a broad range
of acts, all of which are likely to deceive. Again the rule’s simplicity extends
its reach.
The limitations of purpose-based and interpretive laws, which include their
binary structure and inability to regulate effectiveness, are therefore also the
source of their strengths. By focusing on familiar, binary, informationally
salient questions—meaning and veracity or deceptive purpose—these laws can
effectively reach novel or discrete transaction elements. What those laws lose in
regulatory nuance, such as the ability to address the effectiveness of a communi-
cation, they gain back in their extended reach. By piggybacking on our every-
day interpretive practices and moral judgments to isolate transaction elements
that are especially likely to deceive, interpretive and purpose-based laws can
reach discrete transaction elements that elude causal-predictive regula-
tion.105
I suggested at the beginning of this Part that the domains of interpretive,
purpose-based, and causal-predictive laws are overlapping but not coextensive.
That suggestion can now be given more content, and we can ﬁll in the Venn
diagram:
105. Charles Fried makes a similar point in his discussion of the line between mere negotiations and
the existence of a contract:
This series of alternations in and out of the promise principle has a disquietingly binary look
about it . . . . As it is, however, there are sharp discontinuities, and these are disturbing to the
economic or marginalist mentality. That mentality sees discontinuities as a symptom of
irrationality. . . . [S]uch discontinuities are unavoidable, and indeed . . . are a sign that we are
in the domain of right and wrong, which is a domain of discontinuity.
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 131–32 (1981).
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Transaction elements falling into Group I are in the domain of purpose-based
laws, those in Group II the domain of interpretive laws, and those in Group III
the domain of causal-predictive laws. Transaction elements that fall in only one
of these three groups are subject to only one regulatory approach. Transaction
elements that appear in the intersections of one or more groups are subject to
more than one approach.
B. DESIGN AND DEPLOYMENT
The above discussion has implications for the design and deployment of the
regulatory methods I have identiﬁed. We can begin with how laws are ex-
pressed. The broadly applicable rules of interpretive and purpose-based laws—
“Do not tell a lie,” “Do not conceal material facts,” and the like—work because
they pick up very ﬁne-grained extralegal rules. Causal-predictive laws must take
Figure 2
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a different approach. A rule like “Do not engage in behavior that is likely to
cause false beliefs” or “Do not use transaction elements that have an empirically
veriﬁable deceptive effect” would not tell legal actors what the law expects of
them. Instead, causal-predictive laws issue more speciﬁc directives like “Mort-
gage sellers shall disclose such-and-such information in such-and-such format,”
or “Cell phone providers shall not bundle phones with plans of duration of more
than x months.” Only speciﬁc directives that apply to narrowly described repeat
transaction elements provide adequate notice of the requirements of causal-
predictive regulation.
The last point has broader consequences for the design of causal-predictive
laws. Both interpretive and purpose-based laws require adjudicators to decide
individual cases based on the very considerations that deﬁne the regulatory
domain. In resolving allegations of deceit, a court or jury inquires into the
meaning and veracity of the statements at issue. To determine whether there was
concealment, the legal fact-ﬁnder makes a judgment about the purpose with
which the defendant acted. Causal-predictive laws are different. They require an
intermediate legislative step in which cognitive theories or empirical results are
applied to repeat transaction elements to produce more speciﬁc directives to
guide both those subject to the law and those who enforce it.
This difference, in turn, raises issues of institutional competence. Richard
Craswell, who generally emphasizes the advantages of causal-predictive meth-
ods, suggests we consider removing “misrepresentation and nondisclosure
cases . . . from the common-law courts entirely and [hand them] over to regula-
tory agencies.”106 The proposal makes good sense with respect to the intermedi-
ate legislative step in causal-predictive lawmaking, especially of the empirical
and theory-based varieties. Regulatory agencies are better situated than are
courts of general jurisdiction to evaluate empirical studies of informational
effects, to apply sophisticated theories of cognitive and behavioral biases, and to
use the results to effectively regulate repeat transaction elements. The difference
in institutional competence suggests, for example, that when false advertising
claims turn on such evidence, they might better be decided by the FTC than by
courts.107
Agency expertise does not extend, however, to interpreting the meaning of
speech acts in the context in which they were uttered, or to determining the
purpose with which a defendant acted. More to the point, there are often good
reasons to leave such commonsense judgments to judges and juries. The
application of interpretive laws requires judgments about an actor’s compliance
with community standards that govern meaning and truth telling. The applica-
tion of purpose-based laws requires an inquiry into the motives and intentions
behind an act or omission. U.S. law regularly leaves such factual determinations
to courts and to juries, who are considered to have a special expertise in
106. Craswell, Taking Information Seriously, supra note 1, at 623.
107. I discuss these aspects of the LanhamAct in Part III.
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community standards and the ability to weigh and evaluate the relevant evi-
dence.108 While it is possible to use surveys, focus groups, or other empirical
methods to test how a speech act is likely to be interpreted, such studies are
expensive and, where the question is only whether the statement was true or
false, it is not obvious that they are more accurate than the ﬁndings of a judge or
jury.
The differences between these regulatory methods also raise questions about
Craswell’s recommendation that the common law incorporate some of the
causal-predictive methods found in consumer-protection law.109 Craswell sug-
gests that plaintiffs claiming misrepresentation or nondisclosure should be
required to “specify some alternative(s) to whatever the defendant actually
said,”110 that “either party should be allowed to dispute the costs or beneﬁts of
those alternatives,”111 and that “either party should be allowed to introduce
empirical evidence as to how similar contracting parties would be likely to
respond to the identiﬁed alternatives.”112 It is not obvious, however, whether the
gains from supplementing interpretive or purpose-based laws with causal-
predictive methods would be worth the costs. This is especially so where the
alleged wrongful behavior involves discrete transaction elements and the
decision maker has limited expertise in cognitive theory or empirical method-
ology.
A last point on the relative strengths of these regulatory methods sounds in a
different register. So far, I have largely avoided discussing the various justiﬁca-
tions for laws of deception, the reasons why a society might choose to regulate
deceptive behavior. One reason is that deception is wrong. Another is that
deception is wasteful. Broadly speaking, interpretive and purpose-based laws
are better suited to regulating for the ﬁrst reason because they incorporate
judgments of everyday morality. Causal-predictive regulation, with its focus on
effects and its sometimes counterintuitive outcomes, is more in line with the
consequentialist reasoning of the second type. This is not to say that interpretive
or purpose-based regulation cannot be justiﬁed on consequentialist grounds, or
108. The above arguments suggest that the Seventh Circuit might have gotten things backwards in
Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992). Kraft argued that the FTC should have considered
extrinsic evidence that alleged implied misrepresentations in its advertisements for processed cheese
caused consumer misperception. Id. at 318. The court rejected the argument with the following
reasoning:
Kraft’s reliance on Lanham Act decisions is misplaced. For one, not all courts applying the
Lanham Act rely on extrinsic evidence when confronted with implied claims, but more
importantly, when they do, it is because they are ill equipped—unlike the Commission—to
detect deceptive advertising. And the Commission’s expertise in deceptive advertising cases,
Kraft’s protestations notwithstanding, undoubtedly exceeds that of courts as a general matter.
Id. at 320 (citations omitted).
109. See Craswell, Taking Information Seriously, supra note 1, at 624–30.
110. Id. at 624.
111. Id. at 625.
112. Id. at 626.
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causal-predictive regulation on deontological ones. But the different methods do
lend themselves to different reasons for regulation.
III. APPLICATION: SECTION 43(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT
The previous Part argued that the domains of interpretive, promise-based, and
causal-predictive laws are overlapping but not coextensive, as represented in the
Venn diagram in Figure 2. Interpretive laws capture only false communications,
purpose-based laws only acts done with a veriﬁable wrongful purpose, and
causal-predictive laws only repeat transaction elements. Which regulatory method
or methods should be applied where the domains overlap? Consider an intention-
ally false communication that is repeated across many transactions. Should it be
subject to interpretive regulation, purpose-based regulation, causal-predictive
regulation, or to some combination of the three?
Judicial interpretations of the Lanham Act’s false advertising provisions
illustrate how lawmakers have mixed and matched regulatory methods in the
intersection. The goal of the previous Parts was to map the law of deception as a
whole. Because that map describes a broad area it does not include many local
landmarks. This Part sketches in the details of a single region: judicial interpreta-
tions of the Lanham Act. The ﬁrst section provides an overview of this area of
law. The second uses the analytic tools developed in Part II to explain and
evaluate its topography.
A. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LANHAM ACT’S FALSE ADVERTISING PROVISIONS
Section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act prohibits the use of any “false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which . . . in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s
goods, services, or commercial activities.”113 A party who is injured by such
false advertising—a competitor or a consumer—can seek an injunction or
damages.114 Courts are in broad agreement on the elements of a section 43(a)
false advertising claim. As listed by the First Circuit, they are:
(1) a false or misleading description of fact or representation of fact by the
defendant in a commercial advertisement about its own or another’s product;
(2) the statement actually deceives or has the tendency to deceive a substantial
segment of its audience; (3) the deception is material, in that it is likely to
inﬂuence the purchasing decision; (4) the defendant placed the false or
misleading statement in interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or
is likely to be injured as a result of the false or misleading statement, either by
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006).
114. See FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982); FTC v. Sw. Sunsites, Inc.,
665 F.2d 711, 718 (5th Cir. 1982).
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direct diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by a lessening of goodwill
associated with its products.115
Section 43(a) does not have a scienter requirement but holds advertisers strictly
liable for their false advertising. “It is well-settled that no proof of intent or
willfulness is required to establish a violation of Lanham Act § 43(a) for false
advertising.”116
While the elements of a section 43(a) claim include the advertisement’s
tendency to deceive, courts have held that literally false advertisements are
presumptively deceptive.117 Consequently, a plaintiff who can point to a literal
falsehood need not introduce additional evidence of tendency to deceive, unless
it is needed to rebut the defendant’s evidence of no deceptive effect. In W.L.
Gore & Associates v. Totes, Inc., for example, where the defendants had
advertised their golf jacket as made of the “best waterproof fabric you can ﬁnd,”
the district court held that it was enough for the plaintiff to show that the jacket
was not in fact waterproof.118 If “the claim is literally false, the court need not
consider the actual effect on the buying public.”119
When an advertisement is literally true but alleged to include an implicit
falsehood, courts generally require extrinsic evidence to establish its nonliteral
meaning and its tendency to deceive.120 As the Second Circuit has explained, in
such cases it “is not for the judge to determine, based solely upon his or her own
intuitive reaction, whether the advertisement is deceptive.”121 The most com-
mon types of evidence of deceptive meaning and effect are consumer surveys
and copy tests, which show one or more ads to a representative group of
consumers, though courts have also accepted the direct testimony of consumers
115. Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 33 n.6 (1st Cir. 2000)
(emphasis removed).
116. Vector Prods., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 397 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2005); cf. Cashmere
& Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 313–15 (1st Cir. 2002); PPX Enters., Inc. v.
Audioﬁdelity Enters., Inc., 818 F.2d 266, 272 (2d Cir. 1987).
117. See Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 683, 693 (6th Cir. 2000)
(“Because proof of ‘actual confusion’ can be difﬁcult to obtain, most of the circuits have ruled that
when a statement is literally false, a plaintiff need not demonstrate actual customer deception in order
to obtain relief under the Lanham Act.” (citation omitted)). For a discussion of the emergence of and
judicial rationales for this rule, see Richard J. Leighton, Literal Falsity by Necessary Implication:
Presuming Deception Without Evidence in Lanham Act False Advertising Cases, 97 TRADEMARK REP.
1286, 1289–91 (2007) [hereinafter Leighton, Literal Falsity by Necessary Implication]. Courts have
also held that a literal falsehood creates a presumption that the falsehood is material. See Richard J.
Leighton, Materiality and Pufﬁng in Lanham Act False Advertising Cases: The Proofs, Presumptions,
and Pretexts, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 585, 596–99 (2004).
118. 788 F. Supp. 800, 804–05 (D. Del. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id. at 805.
120. See, e.g., Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 273 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Johnson
& Johnson * Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Co., 960 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir.
1992)); Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass’n, 178 F.3d 1035, 1043 (8th Cir. 1999);
Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 19 F.3d 125,
129–30 (3d Cir. 1994).
121. Johnson & Johnson, 960 F.2d at 297.
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and evidence of consumer complaints.122 In United Industries Corp. v. Clorox
Co., for example, the Eighth Circuit considered a claim that “Kills Roaches in
24 Hours,” even if expressly true, falsely implied that the product would kill all
of the roaches in a home and that the competition would not do so.123 In
afﬁrming the denial of a preliminary injunction, the court observed that the
proper construction “is highly dependent upon context and inference,” and that
the plaintiff’s interpretation was “unsupported at this point by expert testimony,
surveys, or consumer reaction evidence of any kind.”124
The evidentiary rules for allegations of literal falsehoods and those for
allegations of implicit falsehoods are each subject to exceptions. First, not every
literal falsehood can support a section 43(a) claim. A literally false statement is
not false advertising if it is sales talk or puffery.125 In Pizza Hut v. Papa John’s
International, for example, the Fifth Circuit held that although the description,
“Better Ingredients. Better Pizza,” could be misleading in a comparative ad,
standing alone it was “a general statement of opinion regarding the superiority
of its product over all others . . . epitomiz[ing] the exaggerated advertising,
blustering, and boasting by a manufacturer upon which no consumer would
reasonably rely.”126 A defendant who raises a sales talk defense is not required
to introduce evidence of how consumers interpret the advertisement or whether
they rely on it.127 Instead, it is the court that makes the determination on the
basis of its own sense of the reasonable interpretation of the statement and
whether it would be reasonable to rely on it.128
This marks an important difference between the puffery defense and the rule
for implicit misrepresentations. When a plaintiff argues that a literally true
statement had an implicit false meaning, the court generally requires extrinsic
evidence, such as copy tests or consumer surveys, of that meaning and its effect
on consumers.129 When a defendant argues that a literally false advertisement
should be interpreted nonliterally, as opinion, exaggeration, exhortation, or
impetration, the court decides the matter itself, on the basis of no evidence other
than the judge’s familiarity with the English language.130
But there are also exceptions to the extrinsic-evidence requirement for claims
of implicit misrepresentation. The ﬁrst is the so-called necessary-implication
rule. In 1982, a district court considered an advertisement by Robot-Coupe with
122. See CHARLES MCKENNEY & GEORGE F. LONG III, 1 FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION: LANHAM ACT
43(A) § 6:5 (2011).
123. See 140 F.3d 1175, 1178, 1182–83 (8th Cir. 1998).
124. Id. at 1183.
125. See Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 390–91 (8th Cir. 2004); Pizza
Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 496 (5th Cir. 2000); Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464,
474 (2d Cir. 1995).
126. Pizza Hut, 227 F.3d at 498.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See MCKENNEY & LONG, supra note 122.
130. Cf. Pizza Hut, 227 F.3d at 498.
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the headline,
Robot-Coupe: 21
Cuisinart: 0,131
followed by the sub-headline: “when all 21 of the three-star restaurants in
France’s Michelin guide choose the same professional model food processor,
somebody knows the score—shouldn’t you?”132 The opinion stated:
The basic point is that the ad states, by necessary implication, that Robot-
Coupe and Cuisinarts both build professional model food processors, and that
French restaurateurs, presented with two existing alternatives, chose the
Robot-Coupe model over the Cuisinarts model by the score of 21 to 0. I
appreciate that the ad does not make that statement in haec verba. . . . [But the
words in the advertisement], thus arranged, are the practical, grammatical,
syntactical equivalent . . .133
The opinion concluded that, because Cuisinarts did not in fact market a profes-
sional-model food processor, the advertisement was equivalent to a literal
falsehood134 and could therefore be enjoined “without regard to consumer
reaction.”135 Since then, six circuits have recognized the doctrine of “necessary
implication,”136 which provides that an advertisement’s necessary implications
are to be treated the same as its literal claims.137 “If the words or images,
considered in context, necessarily imply a false message, the advertisement is
literally false and no extrinsic evidence of consumer confusion is required.”138
Several courts have also held that where there is no express misrepresenta-
tion, proof of a defendant’s deceptive intent and investment of signiﬁcant
resources in a false advertising campaign can obviate the need for extrinsic
evidence of a deceptive effect. In U-Haul International, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., the
district court found that Jartran’s advertisements regularly compared Jartran’s
temporary promotional prices to U-Haul’s standard prices plus temporary volume-
131. Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe Int’l Corp., No. 81 Civ 731-CSH, 1982 WL 121559, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1982) (capitalization altered).
132. Id. at *2 (capitalization altered).
133. Id. at *1–*2.
134. See id. at *2.
135. Id. at *1 (quoting Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 277 (2d Cir. 1981))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
136. See Leighton, Literal Falsity by Necessary Implication, supra note 117, at 1294–1306.
137. See, e.g., Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A]n
advertisement can be literally false even though it does not explicitly make a false assertion, if the
words or images, considered in context, necessarily and unambiguously imply a false message.”);
Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Although
factﬁnders usually base literal falsity determinations upon the explicit claims made by an advertise-
ment, they may also consider any claims the advertisement conveys by ‘necessary implication.’”).
138. Time Warner, 497 F.3d at 158.
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related fees and that “Jartran arrived at the advertised price for its equipment by
selecting a promotional rate that would have consumer impact.”139 The court
then held that the “[p]ublication of deliberately false comparative claims gives
rise to a presumption of actual deception and reliance.”140 Jartran appealed,
arguing among other things that the district court should have required U-Haul
to provide extrinsic evidence of consumer deception and reliance. The Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument:
The expenditure by a competitor of substantial funds in an effort to deceive
consumers and inﬂuence their purchasing decisions justiﬁes the existence of a
presumption that consumers are, in fact, being deceived. He who has at-
tempted to deceive should not complain when required to bear the burden of
rebutting a presumption that he succeeded.141
Other courts have permitted similar inferences of actual consumer deception
from the defendant’s expenditures of sums for the purpose of inﬂuencing
consumers.142
A ﬁnal potential exception to the Lanham Act rule for alleged implicit
misrepresentations has not been embraced by courts but is suggested by FTC
rulings under the unfair or deceptive advertising provisions in the Federal Trade
Commission Act.143 The FTC has determined that “[a]bsent an express or
implied reference to a certain level of support, and absent other evidence
139. 601 F. Supp. 1140, 1147 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff’d in part, modiﬁed in part, rev’d in part, 793 F.2d
1034 (9th Cir. 1986).
140. Id. at 1149 (emphasis added).
141. U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 1986).
142. See, e.g., Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 316 (1st Cir.
2002) (“It is well established that if there is proof that a defendant intentionally set out to deceive or
mislead consumers, a presumption arises that customers in fact have been deceived.”); Balance
Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 683, 694–95 (6th Cir. 2000) (adopting the rule in
Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 110 F.3d 1329, 1336 (8th Cir. 1997)); Boosey & Hawkes Music
Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 493 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[I]n order for a Lanham Act
plaintiff to receive an award of damages the plaintiff must prove either actual consumer confusion or
deception resulting from the violation, . . . or that the defendant’s actions were intentionally deceptive
thus giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of consumer confusion.” (quoting George Basch Co. v.
Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Porous
Media, 110 F.3d at 1336 (“A predicate ﬁnding of intentional deception, as a major part of the
defendant’s marketing efforts, contained in comparative advertising, encompasses sufﬁcient harm to
justify a rebuttable presumption of causation and injury in fact.”); Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 40, 1991 WL
11008502, at *31–32 (1991) (holding that Kraft designing the ads with intent to capitalize on consumer
calcium deﬁciency concerns was evidence of the materiality of its calcium content claims), enforced,
970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992); FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 42 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (holding that “the vast expenditure of advertising dollars on tar ratings strongly supports public
reliance because advertising expenditures presumptively have the effect intended”).
143. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); see also FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantia-
tion, in Thompson Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 1984 WL 565377, at app. (1984). What counts as a
reasonable basis depends on factors such as “the type of claim, the product, the consequences of a false
claim, the beneﬁts of a truthful claim, the cost of developing substantiation for the claim, and the
amount of substantiation experts in the ﬁeld believe is reasonable.” Id.
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indicating what consumer expectations would be, the Commission assumes that
consumers expect a ‘reasonable basis’ for claims.”144 The upshot is a legal
presumption, or default interpretation, that a factual statement in an advertise-
ment implicitly represents that the advertiser has a reasonable amount of
evidence for the claim.145 The rule is important in cases in which it is difﬁcult to
substantiate whether a claim is true or false. Where it applies, the proponent of a
false advertising claim need not prove that the advertisement was literally false,
so long as she can show that the advertiser did not have a reasonable basis for
making it. What is crucial for my purposes is that reasonable-basis claims
require no extrinsic evidence of the implied representation. The FTC has simply
decided to read a representation of reasonable basis into advertised factual
claims.
Although the reasonable-basis default is ﬁrmly established for actions under
the FTC Act’s deceptive advertising provisions,146 courts have not applied it to
false advertising claims under the Lanham Act.147 But there are reasons to think
that the default representation of a reasonable basis should apply here too.148
The Third Circuit has adopted a more modest version of the rule: “[A] court
may ﬁnd that a completely unsubstantiated advertising claim by the defendant is
per se false without additional evidence from the plaintiff to that effect.”149 And
the reasons for adopting the default reasonable-basis representation that I
identify in the next section apply pari passu to Lanham Act claims. Regardless
144. FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, supra note 143.
145. Or as Richard Craswell has put it: “The FTC has ruled that most claims about a product’s
attributes also imply a subsidiary claim: that the manufacturer had a reasonable evidentiary basis for
believing the primary claim to be true.” Craswell, Control Ads, supra note 1, at 781.
146. See, e.g., Daniel Chapter One, No. 9329, 2010 FTC LEXIS 23, at *9 (Mar. 22, 2010)
(“Longstanding case law has consistently held that advertising claims can be found deceptive . . .
if they are shown . . . to lack a reasonable basis substantiating the claims . . . .”).
147. The Third Circuit has speciﬁcally declined to apply the FTC standard to Lanham Act cases.
See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 19
F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Drawing a distinction between the FTC plaintiff and the Lanham Act
plaintiff, this court held in Sandoz that the FTC plaintiff could rely on its own determination of
deceptiveness, but the Lanham Act plaintiff ‘bears the burden of proving actual deception by a
preponderance of the evidence.’” (quoting Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d
222, 228–29 (3d Cir. 1990))); Sandoz, 902 F.2d at 229 (“We hold that it is not sufﬁcient for a Lanham
Act plaintiff to show only that the defendant’s advertising claims of its own drug’s effectiveness are
inadequately substantiated under FDA guidelines.”). The Second Circuit has similarly held that
showing lack of substantiation is insufﬁcient in Lanham Act cases. See Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Chesebrough-Pond’s Inc., 747 F.2d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Nat’l Council Against Health
Fraud, Inc. v. King Bio Pharm., Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 216–18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (articulating
the distinction between LanhamAct and FTC standards).
148. Perhaps the best doctrinal argument against judicial application of the rule is the Seventh
Circuit’s holding that claims of implicit misrepresentation under the FTC Act do not need to be
supported by extrinsic evidence, given the Commission’s greater expertise in false advertising. See
Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 320 (7th Cir. 1992). I argued above that, given the FTC’s greater
expertise in evaluating empirical studies and the judiciary’s expertise in interpretation, this statement
gets things backward. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
149. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d
578, 590 (3d Cir. 2002).
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of whether courts ultimately take this path, the possibility will provide a nice
illustration of some of the themes I have discussed above.
B. MEANING, PURPOSE, AND CAUSE IN THE LANHAM ACT
The distinction between interpretive, purpose-based, and causal-predictive
laws helps make sense of collection of judicially crafted rules for false advertis-
ing claims under the Lanham Act. This is not to say that those rules are
perfectly designed or cut at the joints. I will argue, for example, that courts
might make greater use of consumer surveys and other evidence before permit-
ting a sales talk defense. More generally, I have argued above that courts have
less competence than regulatory agencies in creating and evaluating empirical
studies. Here I agree with Craswell’s suggestion: If we want to use consumer
surveys, copy tests, and other empirical methods, not to mention the testimony
of experts in advertising and cognitive theory, we would do better to assign
enforcement to the FTC or another administrative agency.150 And it is worth
asking more generally whether the costs of those empirical methods, given their
inaccuracy and manipulability, are worth the beneﬁts.151 Nor are the factors I
identify the only explanations of these rules. Thus the sales talk defense might
be a judicial attempt to cabin the reach of section 43(a), based on individual
judges’ doubts about the policy behind the Lanham Act.152 And the necessary
implication rule might well represent a backlash against the use of consumer
surveys and other extrinsic evidence of meaning, prompted by judicial experi-
ence with the manipulability of such evidence.153
All that being said, there is an internal logic to judicial application of section
43(a). No matter what policies or principles have pushed individual judges to
develop them, the Lanham Act rules for literal and implicit falsehoods, sales
talk, necessary implication, and intent to deceive reﬂect a functioning mix of
interpretive, purpose-based and causal-predictive laws, and they nicely illustrate
how these approaches can be combined in light of their relative strengths and
weaknesses.
Most advertisements are both communicative acts and repeat transaction
elements. An advertisement is typically intended, among other things, to commu-
nicate a message, and it is repeated in substantially the same form across
multiple transactions. This is why advertisements can be the object of both
interpretive and causal-predictive laws. More speciﬁcally, as judicial application
of the Lanham Act demonstrates, they are amenable to both interpretive and
empirical regulatory methods. Where there is proof of deceptive purpose, an
150. See Craswell, Taking Information Seriously, supra note 1, at 623.
151. Rebecca Tushnet has documented the misuse of cognitive theory and psychological studies in
trademark dilution law. See generally Tushnet, supra note 84.
152. See, for example, Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 201 F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2000),
where Judge Easterbrook questions the policy of prohibiting “factual propositions that are susceptible
to misunderstanding.”
153. See Leighton, Literal Falsity by Necessary Implication, supra note 117, at 1286–87.
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advertisement might also fall within the domain of purpose-based laws. In terms
of my Venn diagram, most advertisements reside within the intersection of
Groups II and III, and some fall within the intersection of all three domains.
The evidentiary rules for allegations of literal falsehoods and for allegations
of implicit falsehoods embody different regulatory approaches. When a plaintiff
alleges literal falsehood, courts apply the interpretive method. Here the only
question is the literal meaning of the advertisement and whether it was false.
The plaintiff is not required to produce extrinsic evidence of the advertisement’s
meaning or probable effect on its target audience. The general rule for claims of
implied misrepresentation, in distinction, instructs courts to apply the causal-
predictive method. A plaintiff who alleges an implicit falsehood must introduce
evidence, such as consumer surveys or copy tests, of the advertisement’s
meaning and effect. The factual question is not, in the ﬁrst instance, one of
interpretation, but of causation: what is the advertisement’s probable effect on
consumers?
The difference is explained by the difﬁculty in applying the rules of conversa-
tional implicature to mass advertising. To identify an advertisement’s literal
meaning, one need only look at the dictionary deﬁnitions of its words. There is
no need to inquire into its reasonable interpretation in light of the surrounding
circumstances. To identify an advertisement’s implicit meaning, one must know
how to apply the rules of conversational implicature in this nonconversational
context. There are several problems here. First, an advertisement does not
appear in a reciprocal series of communications between the advertiser and
target audience. Grice’s cooperative principle requires that a speaker make her
“conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs,
by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are
engaged.”154 Advertisements do not appear at a “stage” in an “exchange” where
there is an “accepted purpose or direction.”155 There is no conversation that
might establish the parties’ interests and reasonable expectations of one another.
Second, there are no other generally accepted interpretive norms to replace
those of conversational implicature. Everyone knows that advertisements aim
both to share information and to inﬂuence behavior. There is little popular
consensus on the appropriate mix between these goals, on where advertisements
fall on the spectrum between reliable representations and sales talk. Third,
advertisements involve a single message to diverse recipients. Because there is
no shared understanding of how advertisements should be interpreted, the same
advertisement is likely to elicit different reactions in different consumers,
depending on their different backgrounds and expectations. While we can all
agree how a consumer should interpret the literal meaning of an advertisement,
there is neither a factual nor normative baseline for how consumers do or should
interpret an advertisement’s implicit meanings.
154. Grice, supra note 29, at 26.
155. Id.
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All of these factors recommend against applying the interpretive approach to
allegations of implicitly false advertising. Rather than relying on the back-
ground understanding of a court or a jury, the law might do better by gathering
evidence of an advertisement’s actual effects—by employing empirical causal-
predictive methods. Whether it does better depends in large part on the accuracy
and expense of those methods when applied to advertisements by courts. These
are empirical questions whose answers are beyond the scope of this Article. The
rule for alleged implicit falsehoods, however, suggests that courts believe they
can accurately and cost-effectively evaluate empirical studies to identify an
advertisement’s deceptive effect.
It is possible to apply empirical causal-predictive methods to claims of
implicitly false advertising because advertisements are repeat transaction ele-
ments. So too are advertisements that contain literal falsehoods. Why then
demand extrinsic evidence only for claims of implicit misrepresentation? Why
not require extrinsic evidence of deceptive effect also from plaintiffs who allege
explicit falsehoods?
There are two answers. The ﬁrst goes back to cost. Empirical studies are
expensive. Courts and juries are competent at identifying literally false advertise-
ments, and literally false advertisements—so long as the audience does not take
them to be mere sales talk—are likely to have a deceptive effect. The interpre-
tive method therefore provides a cheap and effective way to identify advertising
that is likely to deceive. Requiring additional extrinsic evidence of deceptive
effect would be redundant and wasteful.
The second reason turns on the purpose of the Lanham Act’s false advertising
provisions. There is little doubt that these provisions are designed to protect
competitors and consumers from the effects of false advertising on purchasing
decisions.156 But this might not be the law’s only purpose, at least in the eyes of
156. Although section 45 of the Lanham Act lists the Act’s purpose as protection against unfair
competition, courts have held that the Act is also intended to protect consumers. See, e.g., Lacoste
Alligator, S.A. v. Bluestein’s Men’s Wear, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 491, 498 (D.S.C. 1983) (“The underlying
purpose of § 1125 is to prevent unfair competition . . . and to protect consumers against deceptive
designations of origins of goods.” (citing Invicta Plastics (USA) Ltd. v. Mego Corp., 523 F. Supp. 619
(S.D.N.Y. 1981))); Invicta Plastics, 523 F. Supp. at 623 (“The underlying purpose . . . is the protection
of the public, and other competitors . . . .”); Ames Publ’g Co. v. Walker-Davis Publ’ns, Inc., 372 F.
Supp. 1, 13–14 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (“While unarticulated in the Act itself, an underlying purpose of
Section 43(a) appears to be protection of the consuming public from false representations and
descriptions in connection with the advertising of goods and services.”). Some early decisions inter-
preted section 43(a) as applying only to misrepresentations of the same general character as trademark
infringement. See, e.g., Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat’l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 221–22 (D.
Mass. 1949), aff’d, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950). More recently, courts have held that the purpose of
section 43 is to protect against “a wide variety of misrepresentations of products and services.” See
CBS Inc. v. Springboard Int’l Records, 429 F. Supp. 563, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also Allen v. Nat’l
Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting CBS Inc., 429 F. Supp. at 566, for the same
rule). For other cases applying this rule, see, for example, 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust
Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that “section 43(a) has been broadly construed to provide
protection against deceptive marketing, packaging, and advertising of goods and services in com-
merce”), WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, Inc., 724 F.2d 1320, 1331 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that “[t]he purpose of
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courts. False advertising is wrong not only because it causes false beliefs in
consumers, and thereby suboptimal purchasing decisions, but also because
advertisers, like other speakers, have a general obligation to speak truthfully.
The law might care about false advertising not only because of its effects on
consumers, but also because such speech acts violate familiar norms of truth
telling, regardless of their effect. Attaching legal consequences to such viola-
tions is a way for society to support and give effect to those norms. If this is
right, then there is a second reason not to require extrinsic evidence of con-
sumer deception in cases of literal falsehood: society’s interest in truthful
advertising extends beyond advertising’s effects on consumers. The Lanham
Act’s false advertising provisions also function to enforce and support the
widely accepted prohibition against lying, which is based on more than the
effects of such speech.
A similar explanation applies to the rule for literally true advertisements
intended to deceive. The plaintiff who can prove that an advertiser intended its
literally true advertisement to deceive the public is not required to introduce
extrinsic evidence of deceptive effect. This is a purpose-based rule: proof of
wrongful purpose is used to identify the legal wrong. Like the rule for literal
falsehoods, the deceptive-intent rule can be justiﬁed on both consequentialist
and nonconsequentialist grounds. An advertiser’s deceptive purpose is strong
evidence of deceptive effect, sufﬁcient to excuse a plaintiff from the extra
expense of producing extrinsic evidence of it.157 And regardless of its effect,
purposively setting out to deceive the public is the sort of wrongful act that
warrants both an expression of disapprobation and punishment.
What of the other exceptions to the basic evidentiary rules? The above
discussion suggests a potential problem with the sales talk rule, which permits a
judge to decide without recourse to extrinsic evidence that an advertised claim
is mere puffery. Generally speaking, identifying a claim as sales talk is an
exercise in interpretation, requiring application of the rules of conversational
implicature. Whether a statement is best interpreted as an assertion of fact or as
an exhortation to buy depends on the circumstances of its production, just as
other implicit meanings do. If the individual judge’s linguistic sense is an
unreliable instrument for detecting deceptive implicit falsehoods in advertise-
ments, the same should be true of her ability to determine without recourse to
extrinsic evidence whether a literal falsehood is likely to deceive the public.
And yet there is a strong intuition that some advertised statements are
section 43(a) is to create a new federal remedy for . . . unfair competition that results from false
designation of origin or other false representation”), Invicta Plastics, 523 F. Supp. at 623 (holding that
the purpose of the LanhamAct sections is “the protection of the public, and other competitors, from any
misleading advertising or packaging which results in unfair competition”), and Metric & Multistandard
Components Corp. v. Metric’s, Inc., 635 F.2d 710, 713 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that section 43(a) “was
designed to create a new federal remedy for the particular kind of unfair competition that results from
false designation of origin or other false representation”).
157. See U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 1986).
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obvious puffery. When a pizza chain, without mentioning any of its competitors,
advertises “Better Ingredients. Better Pizza.,” we know it is expressing enthusi-
asm for its product, rather than making a factual claim.158 The statement
exempliﬁes “the exaggerated advertising, blustering, and boasting by a manufac-
turer upon which no consumer would reasonably rely.”159 I think there is
something to this intuition. While advertisements do not appear in conversa-
tions, they are not context-free. Most importantly, members of the target
audience generally know they are watching an advertisement. The audience
knows that the speech is an exercise in persuasion and an attempt at inﬂuence,
and it understands generic claims of superiority accordingly. And if that is right,
a judge’s linguistic sense might in some cases be all we need to determine that
an advertised claim is mere puff.
This suggests that the rule for sales talk is akin to the necessary-implication
rule, which holds that some implicit meanings are so certain that, when untrue,
they are the practical equivalent of a literal falsehood, suspending the require-
ment of extrinsic evidence of deceptive effect. The necessary-implication rule
ﬁnds some support in linguistic theory. First, as just noted, while advertisements
do not occur in conversations, they are not context free. Recall Robot-Coupe’s
ad—“Robot-Coupe: 21[.] Cuisinart: 0”160—referring to the number of three-star
restaurants using Robot-Coupe food processors. In the context of a consumer’s
purchasing decision—which is exactly what the advertisement purported to
address—the fact that no three-star restaurants used a Cuisinart model was
relevant only if Cuisinart made a professional model.161 In that context, the
statement read literally would be a non sequitur, violating the maxim, “Be
relevant.”162 While advertisements do not occur in conversations, they are
contextually rich enough to support some conversational implication.
Second, and more generally, not all implicit meanings are the product of
conversational implicature. In addition to conversational implicature, there is
also, in Grice’s nomenclature, conventional implicature, which turns on the
meaning of sentences, and generalized conversational implicature, which is
grounded in customary ways of speaking.163 For example, “she is a judge;
therefore she is honorable,” conventionally implies that all judges are honor-
able. The implicature depends only on the meaning of the words and applies no
matter what the context. Alternatively, the statement, “some judges are tall,”
implies that not all judges are tall because this is how we customarily use the
158. See Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).
159. Id.
160. Cuisinarts, Inc., v. Robot-Coupe Int’l Corp., No. 81 CIV 731-CSH, 1982 WL 121559, at *1–2
(S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1982).
161. Id. at *2.
162. See Grice, supra note 29, at 27.
163. See WAYNE A. DAVIS, IMPLICATURE: INTENTION, CONVENTION, AND PRINCIPLE IN THE FAILURE OF
GRICEAN THEORY 8–9, 157 (1998); see also Kent Bach, The Top 10 Misconceptions About Implicature,
in DRAWING THE BOUNDARIES OF MEANING: NEO-GRICEAN STUDIES IN PRAGMATICS AND SEMANTICS IN HONOR
OF LAURENCE R. HORN 21, 23, 29 (Betty J. Birner & Gregory Ward eds., 2006).
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word “some.” Again the implicature does not depend on context, but here is a
result of general practices rather than the meaning of the words. If courts are
applying the doctrine of necessary implication only in cases of conventional or
generalized conversational implicature, they are perhaps right to treat them
similarly to literal falsehoods. When interpretation alone sufﬁces to identify a
statement as false, there is no need to employ more costly empirical causal-
predictive techniques.
The above paragraphs only scratch the surface of a deep set of questions
involving the possible use of linguistic theory to describe, explain, and perhaps
reform judicial application of the Lanham Act, not to mention other interpretive
laws. Perhaps advertiser sales talk can be identiﬁed by a sort of generalized
conversational implicature, in which case judges are qualiﬁed to rule on sales
talk defenses without extrinsic evidence. Alternatively, maybe determining
whether an advertisement constitutes sales talk depends so much on context that
extrinsic evidence should always be required. With respect to the necessary-
implication rule, one would want to examine its application in light of the types
of implicature that speech-act theorists have recognized. Are courts in these
cases identifying context-independent meanings that rest on conventional or
generalized conversational implicature? Or is this simply a backlash, as some
have suggested, against the use of copy tests and consumer surveys, which
courts have experienced to be unreliable in practice?164
This Article does not attempt to answer these questions. I raise them because
they demonstrate the value of the analytic distinction between the interpretive
and causal-predictive laws. These are in essence questions about the limits of
the interpretive approach, or where to draw the boundaries between the interpre-
tive and causal-predictive methods within this region of the law of deception.
Recognizing that judicial application of the Lanham Act’s false advertising
provisions is in fact an amalgam of different regulatory approaches provides the
materials for an informed evaluation of the law’s design.
The last exception to the evidentiary rules for alleged implicit falsehoods is
somewhat speculative, as will be my discussion of it. The FTC has concluded
that to advertise a factual claim is to implicitly represent that one has a
reasonable basis for making it—that the claim has a reasonable amount of
evidentiary support.165 I have suggested that courts might adopt this rule in
Lanham Act cases. The reasonable-basis rule establishes a legal default. I
argued in Part I that, as compared to the law of contracts, the law of deception
includes remarkably few legal interpretive rules. The reasonable-basis rule is
164. See Leighton, Literal Falsity by Necessary Implication, supra note 117, at 1286–87.
165. Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n to Congressman John D. Dingell, Chairman, U.S. House of
Representatives Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), reprinted in Cliffdale Assocs., Inc.
103 F.T.C. 110 app. at 174, 175 n.5 (1984). The FTC has also held that advertisements implicitly
represent that a product is ﬁt for its intended use. Id. at 177. Like the reasonable-basis rule, the implied
representation of ﬁtness arguably follows not so much from an interpretation of what advertisements do
say as from a policy decision about what they should say.
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interesting because it is a member of that small class.
Why has the FTC adopted this default? The Commission’s statements about
the rule are not very enlightening.166 I would suggest two possible explanations.
First, the reasonable-basis default might be a legal codiﬁcation of the rules of
conversational implicature, speciﬁcally Grice’s second maxim of quality: “Do
not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”167 Perhaps advertisements
imply a reasonable basis so commonly that it would be a waste of resources to
engage in a full-blown empirical inquiry in every case. It is cheaper and just as
accurate to adopt the majority implication as the legal default, shifting the
burden to the defendant-advertiser to demonstrate (with extrinsic evidence) that
its factual statement did not imply a reasonable basis. Second, and not incompat-
ibly, the reasonable-basis default might represent the FTC’s judgment that
regardless of how the public usually understands advertisements, the world
would be a better place if advertisers made factual statements only when they
had a reasonable basis for doing so.168 On this theory, the reasonable-basis
default is desirable not, or not only, because it is the majoritarian default or
tracks extralegal interpretive norms, but because it gives advertisers a new
reason not to make unsubstantiated claims and therefore gives the public a new
reason to trust advertisements.
Under either explanation, the reasonable-basis default nicely exempliﬁes the
plasticity of interpretive laws. By embedding this legal default within the
broader interpretive law of false advertising, the rule can be expected to affect
the public’s understanding of advertisements in nonlegal contexts. Such mecha-
nisms allow the law of false advertising not only to recognize and incorporate
our everyday interpretive practices, but to extend and thereby effect a positive
change in them.
166. See, e.g., Nat’l Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 549–50, 553 (1973) (justifying the reasonable-
basis rule as a measure of deception); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 463 (1972) (same);
Pﬁzer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 62–64 (1972) (justifying the reasonable-basis rule as a standard for evaluating
unfairness); see also 2 FED. TRADE COMM’N § 22:7 (2009); MARY DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION
AND THE LAW § 9:16 (2009).
167. Grice, supra note 29, at 27.
168. Thus an early FTC articulation of the rule took a decidedly moralistic tone:
While we are not deciding the instant case on such a ground, we are inclined to think that an
advertiser is under a duty, before he makes any representation which, if false, could cause
injury to the health or personal safety of the user of the advertised product, to make reasonable
inquiry into the truth or falsity of the representation. He should have in his possession such
information as would satisfy a reasonable and prudent businessman, acting in good faith, that
such representation was true. To make a representation of this sort, without such minimum
substantiation, is to demonstrate a reckless disregard for human health and safety, and is
clearly an unfair and deceptive practice.
Heinz w. Kirchner Trading as Universe Co., 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1294 (1963). The Commission has also
suggested that it is more efﬁcient to put the burden of substantiation on the manufacturer than on the
consumer. Pﬁzer, 81 F.T.C. at 62.
494 [Vol. 100:449THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
CONCLUSION
The distinction between meaning, purpose, and cause illuminates both the
structure and the underlying logic of the law of deception. It also leaves parts of
that law in the shadows. There is room for more research in many different
directions.
First, there is much more to say about each of the regulatory strategies I have
identiﬁed. With respect to interpretive laws, for example, there is the question of
how legal rules can, for better or worse, feed back into and affect our everyday
interpretive practices. Especially interesting here is the occasional use of interpre-
tive defaults in the law of fraud or deceit, such as the FTC’s reasonable-basis
rule for deceptive advertising. Much has been written about the use of interpre-
tive defaults in contract law; virtually nothing has been written about their use
in interpretive laws such as the law of fraud. Another important question here
concerns the reliability of causal-predictive methods. Rebecca Tushnet, for
example, has described the misuse of armchair theorizing and laboratory experi-
ments in the justiﬁcation of trademark dilution.169 And Lauren Willis has
documented the limited practical value of common sense attempts at ﬁnancial-
literacy education.170 The costs of causal-predictive regulation also include
manipulation and error, risks that deserve serious attention.
Second, the interpretive, purpose-based, and causal-predictive approaches do
not exhaust the law’s methods for determining the object of laws of deception.
One could inquire further into the strengths and weaknesses of other regulatory
approaches, including that of neoclassical economics.
Third, this Article has addressed only one side of the design question: ﬁxing
the law’s direct object, the behavior that the law should target. There is also the
question of how to regulate that behavior. In addressing that topic, I have
argued, for example, that scienter requirements serve different functions in
purpose-based laws and in interpretive or causal-predictive laws, that the prob-
lem of notice requires a separate legislative step in causal-predictive lawmak-
ing, and that the different forms of laws require different institutional capacities
in their application. But I have left many larger questions unanswered. When,
for example, are criminal sanctions or punitive damages appropriate? When are
only compensatory remedies? Who should be allowed to bring enforcement
actions: prosecutors, regulators, or private parties? Why and when are height-
ened pleading standards desirable? What is the right mix between federal and
state law in this area? There is much more to say on the different regulatory
techniques one ﬁnds in the law of deception, as well as their possible relation-
ship to the method of deﬁning the regulatory object.
Finally, this Article has made only a start about thinking about the different
169. Tushnet, supra note 84.
170. Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 197–98 (2008);
Lauren E. Willis, Evidence and Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of Financial Literacy Educa-
tion, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 419–20 (2009).
2012] 495THE LAW OF DECEPTION
functions of and justiﬁcations for laws of deception. In the end, the design of a
law must be guided by the reasons for having it, by the purposes it serves and
the principles that justify it. Of particular relevance to the thesis of this Article
are the possible connections to how a law deﬁnes its regulatory object. Because
both interpretive and purpose-based laws recognize and incorporate our extrale-
gal norms of truth telling and fair dealing, they can serve to afﬁrm and support
those norms. But this is not to say that this is their sole or even primary raison
d’eˆtre. It might be that the only proper purpose of the Lanham Act’s false
advertising provisions, for example, is consumer protection, and that it recog-
nizes and incorporates our everyday judgments about wrongful behavior only
for the sake of improving consumer purchasing decisions. Or perhaps those
provisions serve multiple functions or are justiﬁed on more than one principle.
That said, it would seem that both interpretive and purpose-based laws are at
least better suited to the legal enforcement of extralegal norms of fairness and
morality. Causal-predictive laws, in contrast, are by design consequentialist in
their orientation.
The previous paragraphs raise more questions than they answer. But I hope
they indicate a few directions that a systematic theory of the law of deception
might take. This Article’s description of the different roles of meaning, purpose,
and cause in that law is a start.
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